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13/08/2013 In PUBLICATIONS

Nefarious Fallouts of Iran Sanctions

 

This article is based on a talk the author gave at the first-ever expert conference on Iran sanctions to have taken place in Europe. Organized by the Paris Academy of Geopolitics (PAG) at the French Senate on 3 June 2013, the conference assembled legal and economic experts as well as three former European ambassadors to Iran and former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. The passages on Iran’s new President Hassan Rohani have been added in retrospect.

The article has been originally published by the New York-based World Policy Institute, and republished by the Moscow-based Oriental Review. A version of this article has been published in its French original on Le Huffington Post (France and Canadian Quebec editions), Mondialisation.ca (Canada) and in the current issue of the PAG journal Géostratégiques. A German translation will appear in the upcoming issue of the Vienna-based international-politics journal International: Die Zeitschrift für internationale Politik.

The article demonstrates that on various grounds (socio-economic, politico-diplomatic, geopolitical and geo-economic) that the sanctions regime against Iran has been counterproductive. Crucially for Western policymakers and contrary to officially stated goals, the rapid escalation of economic sanctions during the past few years has been accompanied by the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program. The article concludes by urging the sanctions imposers to prepare the political and institutional grounds for meaningful sanctions relief – a prospect the bulk of Iranians wish for and their new President Hassan Rohani is predestined to deliver if the West reciprocates with goodwill.

Iran’s new president, Hassan Rohani, has promised to ease the tensions surrounding the international relations of his country. In line with the will of the majority of Iranians, the issue of economic sanctions – weighing heavily on the latter’s day-to-day life – will be a key to that end.

In general, the purpose of sanctions is to force a political opponent to do what she would not do otherwise. In the case of the sanctions imposed on Iran – during the course of what is commonly but simplistically referred to as the “nuclear crisis” – the stated goal has been to force a reversal of Tehran’s nuclear calculus toward slowing down or even halting its nuclear program. This goal has clearly not been met. Instead this period has witnessed ever more crippling sanctions – a form of “structural violence” exerted upon an entire country and its people.

On the politico-diplomatic level: Hardening the fronts

Economic sanctions are one of the most preferred instruments of Western foreign policy. The immediate Western reaction to the Syrian crisis is the most recent evidence of this. In the Iranian case, sanctions have been an integral part of the transatlantic strategy pursued against Tehran, code-named “coercive diplomacy” in Diplomatic Studies. There, sanctions are usually presented as a quasi-peaceful means and as such inherently part of a purely diplomatic approach geared towards avoiding a military confrontation. However, as the Iraqi case demonstrates, sanctions are the last step before military action. In other words, “smart sanctions” are likely to be succeeded by “smart bombs.”

Apart from this worst-case scenario, sanctions have not proven to facilitate the resolution of conflicts; on the contrary, they rather tend to harden the opposing fronts. Frequently, opposing sides view sanctions through fundamentally different prisms. In this case, while the West conceives of sanctions in a cost–benefit framework – the heavier the costs imposed on the targeted country by way of sanctions, the more willing the sanctioned state will be to offer concessions. Iran on its part sees them as a means of illegitimate pressure against which she ought to resist. This explains why in the last couple of years the escalation of sanctions was accompanied by that of the nuclear program. For example, in 2006 – before the Iran sanctions were elevated to an undoubtedly crippling dimension by the United States and the European Union – Iran had a thousand centrifuges; the number today is much more than tenfold. This reality of the nuclear dynamics in the wake of sanctions remains largely ignored in Western capitals.

Moreover, it should be stressed that policymakers in the West have so far devoted much more time and energy to identifying which new set of sanctions to impose rather than to committedly and creatively finding a diplomatic solution of the decade-old stalemate.

On the socio-economic level: Widening the power gap between the state and society

The popular rhetoric of sanctions incorrectly characterizes the nature of the socio-economic effects imposed on the target country. Contrary to what is commonly claimed, sanctions actually weaken the lower and middle classes, particularly affecting the most vulnerable in society – workers, women andthe youth. As a result, the power gap between the state and society widens. All this, as a matter of fact, actually dampens the prospect of popular uprising. A person struggling for economic survival barely has the luxury of engaging as a citoyen in the struggle for democracy. This explains the firm renunciation of sanctions by Iran’s civil society – voices that the West has largely chosen to ignore.

In political-economic terms, sanctions have largely paralyzed Iran’s civilian economy while state and semi-state economic entities – especially those associated with the Revolutionary Guards – have been able to benefit inter alia by monopolizing imports of various goods via “black channels.” State resources have buoyed those companies that have access to them, leaving others to drown in the tide of rising costs. Sanctions have also prompted enormous growth in the volume of bilateral trade between Iran and China (still about $ 40 billion according to the Iran–China Chamber of Commerce and Industries which is closely related to the regime) – to the detriment of producers and jobs in Iran. The reality of sanctions is that they have cemented the politico-economic power configuration in Iran.

On geopolitical and geo-economic levels: Putting a brake on Iran’s development

Sanctions produce far-reaching effects at the geopolitical and geo-economic levels. Corresponding with the implicit geopolitical rationale for sanctions – that if you cannot control or influence a country, you will resort to weakening it – these restrictions have indeed stunted Iran’s  development trajectory. This inflicted damage has not, however, produced the ultimate goal of reversing Iran’s nuclear and regional policies and has in fact damaged Western interests by boosting the clout of countries like China, Russia, and other regional states.

In the wake of the U.S.-pressured withdrawal of the Europeans from the Iranian market, Iran was virtually handed over to China on a silver plate – something Beijing is indeed quite appreciative of. China’s economic presence in Iran can be witnessed all across the board: from the construction of the Tehran Metro to the exploration of Persian Gulf oil and gas fields.

Iran’s technocrats – a prime victim of the sanctions – observe this development with great concern. Among other things, they have seen that a healthy competition between different foreign competitors is sorely missing, and that the lack of high-tech (formerly delivered by the West) has reduced the quality of domestic production. All of this has a negative impact (mid- and long-term) on Iran’s economic and technological development. If the situation remains unchanged, such damage can hardly be compensated. As another case in point, the sale of Iranian oil to large customers such as China or India has turned into barter – a de facto “junk for oil” program has emerged. In addition, during the past couple of years China has been given preferential rates by Iran for its oil imports.

Finally, some of Iran’s neighboring countries also benefit from the sanctions. Most significantly, due to the energy sanctions against Iran, Russia can safeguard its quasi-monopoly on Europe’s energy supply – a strategic interest held by Moscow which is unlikely to be reversed easily. To a much lesser degree but still noteworthy, Turkey – which has turned into the sole land trade corridor reaching Iran from the West – has seen its profits in its dealings with Iran risen sharply. Not surprisingly, its business press has been cheering the Iran sanctions as providing Ankara with a competitive trade advantage. Also off the radar, Qatar which in the Persian Gulf is sharing the world’s largest gas field with Iran, has been able to exploit South Pars much more rapidly than Iran given the latter’s lack of access to advanced technologies. This has resulted in a tremendous gap of revenues between the two countries of many several billion dollars.

Conclusion: Time for Abandoning Coercive Diplomacy

Ultimately, the policy of sanctions is counter-productive on multiple levels, most sensitively on diplomatic and socio-economic grounds. The sanctions – whether called “crippling” or “targeted” – disproportionately affect the civilian population. “Smart sanctions” are very much an oxymoron as “smart bombs” which allegedly function in surgical precision. And like their military counterparts, “targeted sanctions” inflict extensive “collateral damage.”

Despite the political need to seriously reconsider sanctions as a tool for a judicious and solution-oriented foreign policy, there are many political and institutional barriers to overcome before the extremely dense web of Iran sanctions can be dissolved – which remains not only a huge political challenge but also a moral one. The first step in this direction will be the sober realization among policymakers that while sanctions do have effects, these are not the ones officially proclaimed or desired – neither in socio-economic terms nor in the sphere of Realpolitik when it comes to altering Tehran’s nuclear calculation. Leaving the sanctions against Iran in place advances the specter of an Iraqization of Iran – with all its adverse effects internally (destruction of society) as well as externally (war and destabilization of an already too fragile regional balance).

To pave the way for a new chapter in Iran’s relations with the West, Rohani has already proved his wisdom by his choice of foreign minister. Mohammad-Javad Zarif, Iran’s former ambassador to the UN, has already been labeled as “Tehran’s leading connoisseur of the U.S. political elite”. All this undoubtedly presents the most suited prerequisite towards the aim of alleviating the multi-level liability that sanctions constitute. But at the end, it is the responsibility of those who have imposed the sanctions to initiate the process of their removal. The ball is now in the West’s court. It would truly be the “height of irresponsibility” if one missed this opportunity offered by the Iranian people who have already paid dearly for an utterly miscalculated transatlantic “coercive diplomacy.”

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2013) “Fallouts of Iran Sanctions“, World Policy Journal (online), New York: World Policy Institute, 31 July;

▪ republished on Oriental Review (Moscow), 1 August;

published as “Nefarious Fallouts of Iran Sanctions” on:

▪ Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 5 August;

▪ Payvand Iran News, 5 August;

▪ Iranian.com, 5 August;

▪ Fair Observer, 9 August.

▪ Asfar: The Middle Eastern Journal, No. 3 (August 2013).

 

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“a must-read” — Action Coalition Against Sanctions on Iran.

04/03/2013 In PUBLICATIONS

Sanktionen: Mit Risiken und Nebenwirkungen – gestern im Irak und heute in Iran

 

Abendveranstaltung, 28. Februar 2013, Governance Center Middle East | North Africa, Humboldt–Viadrina School of Governance, Berlin

Governance-Gespräche des Governance Center Middle East | North Africa

Sanktionen – Mit Risiken und Nebenwirkungen: Dynamiken und Auswirkungen der Embargos im Iran und im Irak

Begrüßung durch:

Vorträge und Diskussion mit:

  • Dr. h.c. Hans-Christof Graf von Sponeck ist ein deutscher UN-Diplomat. Er ist Autor politischer Sachbücher, so z.B. von Ein anderer Krieg: Das Sanktionsregime der UNO im Irak (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005). Er lehrt gegenwärtig an der Universität Marburg und am United Nations System Staff College in Turin. Von 1968 bis 2000 war er an verschiedenen Einsatzorten für die Vereinten Nationen tätig, zuletzt in Bagdad (Irak) als UN-Koordinator für Humanitäre Hilfe im Irak. Im Februar 2000 reichte er seinen Rücktritt aus Protest gegen die Sanktionspolitik des UN-Sicherheitsrates ein, die er verantwortlich für das Sterben von mehreren hunderttausend irakischen Kindern sah.
  • Ali Fathollah-Nejad, 1981 in Iran geboren, ist ein deutsch-iranischer Politologe. Er studierte Politikwissenschaft, Soziologie und Rechtswissenschaft an der Universität Münster, der Sciences-Po Lille und der University of Twente. Zurzeit promoviert er an der School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) der University of London über den Einfluss globaler Machtverschiebungen auf Irans internationale Beziehungen. Fathollah-Nejad ist Autor der Studie Der Iran-Konflikt und die Obama-Regierung (Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2010 & 2011). Schwerpunktmäßig beschäftigt er sich mit den Auswirkungen der Iran-Politik und des Sanktionsregimes auf Entwicklungs-, Demokratie- und Friedensaussichten.
  • Matthias Jochheim ist Vorsitzender der deutschen Sektion der IPPNW. Er war im November 2012 im Rahmen einer internationalen Ärztedelegation in Iran und hat dort u.a. das Labbafinejad-Krankenhaus in Teheran, das Opfer des irakischen Chemiewaffeneinsatzes während des achtjährigen Krieges gegen Iran behandelt, besucht und sich über die Folgen der Sanktionen informiert.

Veranstalter:

IPPNW Deutschland (Deutsche Sektion der Internationalen Ärzte für die Verhütung des Atomkrieges/Ärzte in sozialer Verantwortung e.V.) & Governance Center Middle East | North Africa, Humboldt–Viadrina School of Governance.

Photos von der Abendveranstaltung

Photos von der Pressekonferenz am Vormittag

* * *

Pressemitteilung der IPPNW Deutschland vom 28.2.2013:

Sanktionen sind ein langsames Gift, keine Medizin: Nach den Verhandlungen über iranisches Atomprogramm

Auszug: “„Sanktionen sind weder in politischer noch in gesellschaftlicher Hinsicht eine Heilung versprechende Medizin, sondern eher ein langsames Gift. Die laut US-Präsident Obama härtesten Sanktionen, die je in der Geschichte auferlegt wurden, treffen die einfachen Menschen in Iran und nicht etwa das Regime. Die Zivilbevölkerung leidet massiv unter den Folgen, der Humus der Zivilgesellschaft wird langsam aber sicher ausgetrocknet. Somit wächst der Machtvorsprung des Staates gegenüber zivilgesellschaftlicher Widerstandskraft“, kritisiert der deutsch-iranische Politologe Ali Fathollah-Nejad. Wie auch zunehmend in den USA zugegeben werde, sei diese Druck- und Drohpolitik gegen Iran gescheitert.”

* * *

Medienecho (Auszug)

 

INFO IN ENGLISH

This is a collection of information surrounding the panel discussion on “Sanctions – With Risks and Side Effects: Dynamics and Effects of the Embargoes in Iran and Iraq” with Ali Fathollah-Nejad & Dr.h.c. Hans von Sponeck (fmr. UN Assistant Secretary-General & UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq), chaired by Prof. Udo Steinbach (Director, Governance Center Middle East | North Africa, Humboldt–Viadrina School of Governance, Berlin), organized by IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) Germany & the Governance Center Middle East | North Africa, Humboldt–Viadrina School of Governance. The event took place on 28 February in Berlin.
08/11/2012 In PUBLICATIONS

Economic Sanctions against Iran – Pargar (BBC Persian TV)

“Pargar” – Weekly roundtable in which our guests try to answer some of the challenging and controversial questions in modern society.

Tuesday, 16 October 2012

Moderator: Daryoush Karimi

Guests:

Panel 1

  • Dr. Hassan Hakimian (Director, London Middle East Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies [SOAS], University of London & Reader, Economics Department, SOAS)
  • Dr. Djamshid Assadi (Burgundy School of Business, France)

Panel 2

  • Ali Fathollah-Nejad (PhD candidate in International Relations, SOAS)
  • Fariba Shirazi (journalist, London)

 

 

Economic Sanctions against Iran – Pargar (BBC Persian TV) – October 2012 from Ali Fathollah-Nejad on Vimeo.

Download the audio file (26 MB; 56 mins).

 

NOTES BY ALI FATHOLLAH-NEJAD

  • The program has been edited towards the end. What I said at the end were basically two points: (1) I reacted to the debate at the end of the show about the Iran-West stand-off by merely pointing out that the West’s approach towards Iran is called “coercive diplomacy” in Diplomatic Studies not without a reason; (2) I asked whether “smart bombs” would follow in the wake of “smart sanctions.”
  • As to the number of children dying from the effects of the sanctions regime on Iraq (which lasted from 1991 to 2003), here is a collection of sources taken from the Wikipedia article “Sanctions against Iraq: Effects on the Iraqi people during sanctions” (accessed on 17 November 2012), which can provide the basis for both my own indication of 500,000 and the one by Dr. Hakimian’s of 250,000:

‘Researcher Richard Garfield estimated that “a minimum of 100,000 and a more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among young children from August 1991 through March 1998” from all causes including sanctions.[27] Other estimates have put the number at 170,000 children.[14][28][29] UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy said that

if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under-five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998. As a partial explanation, she pointed to a March statement of the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues which states: “Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war.” [30]

Estimates of deaths due to sanctions

Estimates of excess deaths during sanctions vary depending on the source. The estimates vary [30][37] due to differences in methodologies, and specific time-frames covered.[38] A short listing of estimates follows:

– Unicef: 500,000 children (including sanctions, collateral effects of war). “[As of 1999] [c]hildren under 5 years of age are dying at more than twice the rate they were ten years ago.”[30][39]
– Former U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq Denis Halliday: “Two hundred thirty-nine thousand children 5 years old and under” as of 1998.[40]
– “probably … 170,000 children”, Project on Defense Alternatives, “The Wages of War”, 20. October 2003[41]
– 350,000 excess deaths among children “even using conservative estimates”, Slate Explainer, “Are 1 Million Children Dying in Iraq?”, 9. October 2001.[42]
– Economist Michael Spagat: “very likely to be [less than] than half a million children” because estimation efforts are unable to isolate the effects of sanctions alone due to the lack of “anything resembling a controlled experiment”[43], and “one potential explanation” for the statistics showing a decline in child mortality was that “they were not real, but rather results of manipulations by the Iraqi government.”[43]
– “Richard Garfield, a Columbia University nursing professor … cited the figures 345,000-530,000 for the entire 1990-2002 period”[8] for sanctions-related excess deaths.[44]
– Zaidi, S. and Fawzi, M. C. S., (1995) The Lancet British medical journal: 567,000 children.[45] A co-author (Zaidi) did a follow-up study in 1996, finding “much lower … mortality rates … for unknown reasons.”[46]
– Iraq expert Amatzia Baram compared the country’s population growth rates over several censuses and found there to be almost no difference in the rate of Iraq’s population growth between 1977 and 1987 (35.8 percent), and between 1987 and 1997 (35.1 percent), suggesting a much lower total.[47]‘

09/01/2012 In PUBLICATIONS

Statement: Scholars, Academicians, Journalists, and Activists Condemn Murder of Iranian Technical and Scientific Experts

 

On January 12, 2012, a bomb ripped apart a car in Tehran, killing Iranian scientist Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan and his driver, and injuring several others. In the past two years, four other Iranian scientists have been killed in a similar manner. By now, it is clear that this is a systematic campaign with political intentions. Media reports and political pundits attribute Mr. Ahmadi’s killing to targeted assassinations by those opposed to Iran’s nuclear program, both within and outside Iran, or internal factional fighting.

If public reports are true that these assassinations are orchestrated by foreign powers in order to prevent Iran’s ability to go forward with its nuclear capabilities, then we petition those powers to stop these assassinations – a tactic replacing political engagement with covert operations at the expense of innocent civilians. These assassinations provide the Iranian authorities with ample excuse to continue to suppress voices of dissent, even on the Iranian nuclear issue, to arrest and imprison political opposition, and to further curtail the activities of human rights activists.

As academicians, writers, human rights activists, and intellectuals, we condemn these attacks on civilian scientists. Such terrorist actions can only escalate the internal tension and regional conflicts toward a military clash or war. Regardless of where we stand on Iran’s nuclear program, we find these assassinations outrageous because they target technical or scientific elements of a society without due consideration for human rights, due process of international and national laws, and lives of innocent individuals caught in the crossfire.

These types of killings have to stop, not only because they harm a nation’s scientific community and its civilians, but also because they build a deep psychological scar on the nation’s public mind prompting it to ask for revenge in kind. We hope we are living in a better world than that. Killing innocent or even allegedly guilty people without consideration for their human rights and due process, by any force or government anywhere and anytime, is an outrageous act to be protested by all. If covert targeted assassinations of opponents become the order of the day, no one will be safe in this world.

 

01. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, SOAS, University of London
02. Masih Alinejad, Journalist
03. Asieh Amini, Journalist and Human Rights Activist
04. Fariba Amini, Independent Journalist and Writer
05. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Professor, Rutgers University
06. Richard P. Appelbaum, Professor of Sociology, University of California at Santa Barbara
07. Rahim Bajoghli, Human Rights Activist
08. Darioush Bayandor, historian, author
09. Asef Bayat, Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
10. Iris Bazing, MD, Baltimore, Maryland
11. Maria Bennett, Poet, New Jersey, USA
12. Mohammad Borghei, Strayer University.
13. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Professor, Syracuse University
14. Juan Cole, Professor, University of Michigan
15. Shirindokht Daghighian, Independent Scholar & Author
16. Mehrdad Darvishpour, Lecturer at the Malardalen University, Sweden
17. Lucia F. Dunn, Professor of Economics, Ohio State University
18. Goudarz Eghtedari, Ph.D., Voices of the Middle East
19. Mohammad Eghtedari, Economist, Washington, DC
20. Nader Entessar, Professor of Political Science, University of South Alabama
21. Amir Fassihi, Nowruz Foundation for Nonviolence, CA
22. John Foran, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara
23. Ali Fathollah-Nejad, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
24. Yoshie Furuhashi, Editor, MRZine
25. Alexandra Gallin-Parisi, Professor, Trinity University
26. Amir Hossein Ganjbakhsh, Senior Investigator, National Institute of Health, Bethesda, MD
27. Reza Goharzad, Journalist, Los Angeles
28. John L Graham, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Irvine
29. Hossein Hamedani, Professor, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI
30. Nader Hashemi, Professor, University of Denver
31. Esmail Hejazifar, Professor of Physics, Wilmington College, Ohio
32. Paula Hertel, Professor of Psychology, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX
33. Mohsen Heydareian, Ph. D, Political Science, Sweden
34. Fredun Hojabri, Retired Professor of Sharif (Aryamehr) Univeristy of Technology
35. Angie Hougas, Human Rights Activists, McFarland, WI
36. Noushin Izadifar Hart, M.D., Radiation Oncologist, Reston, Virginia
37. Azadeh Jahanbegloo, Sociologist, Wright State University, Ohio
38. Jahanshah Javid, Editor, Iranian.com
39. Hasan Javadi, Retired Professor of Persian Language, University of California, Berkeley
40. Mark C. Johnson, Executive Director, Fellowship of Reconciliation, NY
41. Yahya Kamalipour, Chair, Global Communication Association, Purdue University
42. Aziz Karamloo, MD, Faculty Member, University of California, Los Angeles
43. Mahmood Karimi-Hakak, Professor of Theatre and Film, Siena College, NY
44. Liam Kennedy, Community Board Member,CCPB, UC, Irvine
45. Fatemeh Keshavarz, Professor, Washington University, St. Louis
46. Nanette Le Coat, Associate Professor, Modern Languages and Literatures, Trinity University
47. Arturo Madrid, Professor, Trinity University
48. Ali Akbar Mahdi, Professor Emeritus, Ohio Wesleyan University
49. Azita Mashayekhi, Industrial Hygienist, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
50. Rudi Matthee, Distinguished Professor of Middle Eastern history, University of Delaware
51. Farzaneh Milani, Professor, University of Virginia
52. Yaser Mirdamadi, Independent Scholar
53. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, CMEIL, School of Oriental and African Studies
54. Ida Mirzaie, Ohio State University
55. Valentine M. Moghadam, Professor of Sociology, Northeastern University
56. Mahmood Monshipouri, Professor, San Francisco State University
57. Akbar Montaser, Professor, Department of Chemistry ,George Washington University
58. Reza Mousoli, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK
59. Baquer Namazi, Retired UNICEF Country Representative & Civil Society Activist
60. Arash Naraghi, Assistant Professor of Religion and Philosophy, Moravian College
61. Mohamad Navab, University of California, Los Angeles
62. Farrokh Negahdar, Political Analyst
63. Mohammad-Reza Nikfar, Independent Scholar and Philosopher
64. Azam Niroomand-Rad, Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University Medical Center
65. Farhad Nomani, Professor of Economics, American University of Paris
66. Mehdi Noorbaksh, Associate Professor, Harrisburg University of Science & Technology
67. Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council, Washington, DC
68. Richard T. Peterson, Professor of Philosophy, Michigan State University
69. Davood Rahni, Professor of Chemistry, Pace University, New York
70. Farhang Rajaee, Professor, Carleton University
71. Asghar rastegar, MD, Professor of Medicine, Yale School of Medicinek
72. Thomas M. Ricks, Ph.D., Independent Scholar
73. Mahmoud Sadri, Professor of Sociology, Texas Woman’s University
74. Muhammad Sahimi, Professor, University of Southern California in Los Angeles
75. Hamid Salek, D.D.S. University of Southern California , Los Angeles
76. Reza Sarhangi, Professor, Department of Mathematics, Towson University
77. Mehrdad F. Samadzadeh, University of Toronto
78. Gabriel Sebastian, Author, Futurist
79. Ali Shakeri, Community Board Member, CCPB, UC, Irvine
80. Evan Siegel, Ph.D., Independent Researcher on Iran & Azerbaijan, Adj. Mathematics Prof., CUNY
81. Arman Shirazi, Senior Scientist, CSM North America
82. Sussan Siavoshi, Professor, Trinity University
83. Mark D. Stansbery, Iran Action Network
84. Sussan Tahmasebi, Women’s Rights Activist
85. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Univeristy of Toronto
86. Bahram Tavakolian, Willamette University
87. Farideh Tehrani, Ph.D., Middle Eastern Studies Librarian, Rutgers University, NJ
88. Mary Ann Tetreault, Cox Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, Trinity University
89. Nayereh Tohidi, Professor, California State University, Northridge
90. Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Professor of Art History, Siena College, NY
91. Farzin Vahdat, Research Associate at Vassar College
92. Bill Wolak, Poet, New Jersey, USA
93. Leila Zand, Program Director, Middle East Civilian Diplomacy, Fellowship of Reconciliation
94. Hamid Zangeneh, Professor, Widener University

 

SOURCE

The original English version [pdf]:

Translations in Persian:

  • Akhbare Rooz (Iranian Political Bulletin), 16 January 2012;
  • iran-emrooz.net, 16 January 2012;
  • Shahrgon (“the first and the largest publication for Persian speaking in western Canada”), 16 January 2012.

Translation in French: