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A Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons: Iran’s and Israel’s Long-Term Interests | Atomwaffenfreie Zone: Längerfristige Interessen Irans und Israels

Weiter unten finden Sie die deutsche Fassung des Beitrags.

 

A Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Western Asia:

Why It Would Be in the Long-Term Interest of Both Iran and Israel

Undoubtedly, urgent action towards de-escalation is needed in order to avoid the outbreak of a military confrontation with Iran. What governs the present crisis is the presumed logic of collision in a conflict around nuclear monopoly versus deterrence. However, when adopting a long-term view, the two current antagonists could find their national interests satisfied in a zone free of nuclear weapons. Pointing to such a hopeful prospect might alleviate any deterministic pessimism looming over the conflict that conceives war as the only possible end-game.

More than before, the endless spectacle surrounding Iran’s nuclear program tends to escalate into war. While most security policy debates incessantly sway between the devil (war) and the deep blue sea (sanctions), it is clear that both options cannot eliminate concerns for nuclear proliferation and the well-being of civilian populations. The only sensible way forward would be to abandon such a policy choice that has proven counterproductive and, not surprisingly, has pushed the conflict to the brink of war. Instead, it would be best to focus efforts towards achieving regional disarmament and ultimately a nuclear weapons-free zone. Contrary to widespread assumptions, it can be argued that both Tel Aviv and Tehran have a long-term strategic interest in such a zone.

The only way forward is that of regional disarmament

For Israel, the danger would lie in the nuclearization of other important countries in the region (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). Such a “balance of threats” would then have an unfavourable impact on its security and definitely curtail its military deterrence capability towards its neighbours. Since the “military solution” against the nuclear armament of a larger country – as can be observed in the case of Iran – is hardly considered a sustainable one by Israeli strategists, the only solution would consist in regional disarmament as a way to effectively provide for security.

For its part, Iran as a nuclear weapons state would dramatically lose its natural, geographically determined power position in Western Asia once nuclearization of its geopolitically weaker neighbours (especially those on the Arabian Peninsula) is triggered. Thus, in the medium to long term the possession of nuclear weapons would constitute a great disservice to the grand strategic interests of the country.

Therefore, it seems necessary to appeal to the long-term interests of both states. Far-sighted decision-makers on both sides should come to the conclusion that the future cannot rest on fragile short-term security calculations but in a zone free of nuclear weapons.

The situation necessitates alternative approaches

The above considerations are not meant to hide potential adversities. They are intended to stress the need not to search for solutions in alleged impasses of Realpolitik, all the while a possible resort in fact points to an opposite direction. Just as the German–French arch rivalry could unexpectedly be overcome, history shows us that the Iranian–Israeli rivalry is of geopolitical nature and as such it is by no means immune to a resolution.

The current situation in the region calls for alternative approaches in order to avoid a disastrous war with global ramifications. The spiral of armament and hostility can ultimately only lead into an abyss.

As a report by the EastWest Institute outlined in January, it is high time for a regional security architecture in Western Asia. Both the U.S. and the EU should actively be engaged in assisting such a process, which would require nothing less than a paradigm shift. In order to lay a first foundation stone and at the same time send out de-escalating signals to Tel Aviv and Tehran, active political support from the West will be crucial to make the first UN Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference a success. If the security dilemmas afflicting the region continue to be ignored, it will only be a matter of time before in Europe’s neighboring region the spectacle will flare up in an inferno.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2012) “A Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in Western Asia: Why It Would Be in the Long-Term Interest of Both Iran and Israel”, Payvand Iran News, 9 March;

also published on Iran Review, 10 March 2012;

published as “Let’s Get Even: Nuclear Free Zone Is in the Long-Term Interest of Both Iran and Israel“, Iranian.com, 10 March 2012;

an edited version initially appeared as “A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East“, guest column, Informed Comment, 1 March 2012. (Listed as “Resource” for the No War On Iran campaign of the Coalition For Peace Action [CFPA], Princeton, NJ.)

 

REACTIONS

  • George Fernee (2012) “The U.S. and Iran: A Pathology of Paternalism“, International Affairs at LSE (the blog of LSE IDEAS), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 11 March.
  • Linked by the Information Centre of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 12 March 2012.

 

 

* * * * *

Eine atomwaffenfreie Zone in Westasien:

Wieso sie im längerfristigen Interesse Irans und Israels liegt

Das unendliche Spektakel rund ums iranische Atomprogramm tendiert wie kaum zuvor gen Kriegseskalation. Während die meisten sicherheitspolitischen Debatten unablässig zwischen Pest (Krieg) und Cholera (Sanktionen) hin- und herschwanken, ist es klar, dass beide Optionen Bedenken in Bezug auf nukleare Proliferation und dem Wohlergehen der Zivilbevölkerungen nicht beseitigen können. Der einzig sinnvolle Weg nach vorn wäre diese vermeintliche Politik-Alternative, die sich als kontraproduktiv erwiesen hat und den Konflikt keineswegs überraschend an den Rand eines Krieges gebracht hat, aufzugeben und sich anstelle dessen um regionale Abrüstung und letztendlich um eine atomwaffenfreie Zone zu bemühen. Um einen aus der Auseinandersetzung um nukleare Monopole und Abschreckung resultierenden Zusammenstoß zu verhindern, stellt die Einrichtung einer solchen Zone wohl die einzig nachhaltige Lösung dar.

Strategische Weitsicht zum Durchbruch verhelfen

Entgegen weitverbreiteter Auffassungen hätten sowohl Tel Aviv als auch Teheran durchaus ein längerfristiges strategisches Sicherheitsinteresse an einer atomwaffenfreien Zone. Eine schwerlich zu unterbindende nukleare Proliferation in der Region hätte nämlich für beide Seiten negative Folgen.

Für Israel bestünde die Gefahr in einer infolge einer Atomwaffenfähigkeit Irans erfolgende Nuklearisierung anderer gewichtiger Länder der Region (die Türkei, Saudi-Arabien und Ägypten). Solch ein „Gleichgewicht des Schreckens“ würde sich unvorteilhaft auf seine Sicherheit auswirken und seine militärische Abschreckungsfähigkeit gegenüber den Nachbarn empfindlich beschneiden. Da die „militärische Lösung“ gegen die Atombewaffnung eines größeren Landes – wie im Falle Irans zu beobachten – auch von israelischen Strategen als kaum nachhaltig eingestuft wird, bleibt nur der Weg der regionalen Abrüstung, um tatsächlich Sicherheit zu gewährleisten.

Iran seinerseits, als atomwaffenfähiges Land, würde durch die Nuklearsierung seiner geopolitisch schwächeren Nachbarn (v.a. jene auf der arabischen Halbinsel) seine natürliche, geographisch bedingte Machtposition in Westasien dramatisch einbüßen. Somit erwiese sich mittel- und langfristig eine Atombewaffnung als ein Bärendienst gegenüber den großstrategischen Interessen des Landes.

Insofern gilt es an diese längerfristigen Interessen dieser Länder zu appellieren. Es müsste sich bei weitsichtigen Entscheidungsträgern auf beiden Seiten die Einsicht durchsetzen, dass die Zukunft nicht auf fragilen, da kurzfristig angelegten Sicherheitskalkulationen auf der Basis von nuklearer Aufrüstung und gegenseitiger Abschreckung fußen kann, sondern in einer atomwaffen- und massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone. Dadurch würde schließlich beiden Sicherheit und friedliche Koexistenz gewährt werden können.

Deeskalierende Signale vonnöten

Die angestellten Überlegungen zu der Realisierbarkeit solch einer Zone sollen nicht über Widrigkeiten hinwegtäuschen, doch aber einen Anstoß dafür bieten, nicht in scheinbar realpolitischen Sackgassen nach Lösungen zu fahnden, während ein Ausweg eher in eine gegensätzliche Richtung weist. Genauso wie die deutsch-französische Erzfeindschaft überraschend überwunden werden konnte, so zeigt uns die Geschichte, dass die iranisch-israelische Rivalität geopolitischer Natur ist und als solche einer Regelung gegenüber keineswegs immun ist.

Die zurzeit dramatische Lage in der Region führt die Dringlichkeit eines alternativen Ansatzes zur Vermeidung von katastrophalen Kriegen vor Augen, deren Auswirkungen nicht nur regional, sondern global zu verzeichnen wären. Denn die Spirale der Aufrüstung in der Region gepaart mit Feindseligkeiten der Parteien kann letztlich nur in den Abgrund führen – all das während man die alles entscheidende Sicherheitsfrage in unverantwortlichem Maße unter den Tisch hat fallen lassen.

Wie das EastWest Institute in einem Bericht letzten Monat darlegte, sei es höchste Zeit für eine regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur in Westasien. Diesem Prozess sollten die USA und die EU aktiv behilflich sein, was nichts weniger als einen Paradigmenwechsel erfordere. Um dafür einen ersten Grundstein zu legen und zugleich deeskalierende Signale nach Tel Aviv und Teheran auszusenden, wäre eine aktive politische Unterstützung des Westens für den Erfolg der ersten UN-Konferenz zur Etablierung einer massenvernichtungswaffenfreien Zone im Nahen und Mittleren Osten unabdingbar. Ignoriert man weiterhin die Sicherheitsdilemmata, die die Region plagen, wird es nur eine Frage der Zeit sein, bis in der europäischen Nachbarregion das Spektakel in einem Inferno aufgeht.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2012) “Gleichgewicht der Abrüstung: Atomwaffenfreie Zone in Westasien“, The European, 19. Februar;

ebenso veröffentlicht als: “Atomwaffenfreie Zone in Westasien: Wieso sie im längerfristigen Interesse Irans und Israels liegt“, Telepolis, 24. Februar.

 

 

A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East

An Obligation Imposed by the »Arab Spring« and the Israel–Iran Conflict

 

With the war drums on Iran sounding again and the Arab Revolts following an arduous path, the question of a sustainable perspective for a conflict-ridden region remains to be dealt with. After all, the lack of both security and cooperation is an enduring malady plaguing the region.

Civil-society effort towards common security and regional cooperation

Some years ago a civil-society initiative for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) was spearheaded in Germany by peace and conflict researcher Prof. Mohssen Massarrat in collaboration with the German branches of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). After decades of violent conflicts in the region, the initiators chose not to sit down and wait anymore, but decided to assemble civil-society actors from all countries concerned in order to promote a perspective for peace, security and cooperation – something state actors have carelessly neglected. One of its key aims is the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

After a first workshop held in Germany in January 2011, a second took place by late October at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London in cooperation with its Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD). The meeting was linked to an annual CISD conference on a related subject, the 6th SOAS/British Pugwash London Conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.

So far civil-society forces from almost all countries of the region have been brought together. Unified in the desire to break out from the vicious cycle of regional militarization, they want to offer a vision for common security and regional cooperation. In addition to security policy, the CSCME process comprises a number of fields for cooperation, among others in the areas of socio-economic development, cross-border resource management, inter-religious and -cultural dialogue, and health. It is hoped that the next expert conference will take place in the region itself. All of that in view of holding a founding conference for the civil-society CSCME process in the near future.

For 2012 (perhaps more realistically for 2013), the first United Nations Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference is planned, for which Finland has been chosen as host. Ideally, concrete steps towards the realization of that aim would be defined there and civil-society groups involved.

The “Arab Spring”: The necessity of a veritable regional security architecture

An important topic of the last workshop in London was the “Arab Spring” which demonstrated that the pejoratively dismissed “Arab Street” is not a passive object for authoritarian rule, but that societies can offensively fight for their own needs and interests, and eventually bring about change. This development has emboldened the initiative for a CSCME as it showed that civil-society pressure can indeed yield tangible results.

Importantly, if we comprehend the revolutionary process in the Arab world to be motivated by a triad of popular demands, namely the pursuit of socio-economic justice, political freedoms, and independence, what is intimately connected to the latter is the question of security, especially for those countries so far over-dependent on non-regional powers.

The Iran–Israel conundrum: A WMD-free zone as the only sustainable solution

Beyond that implicit demand inherent to the Arab uprisings for security and coexistence, there is another front which propels us to contemplate about new paths and solutions. The seemingly never-ending spectacle around the so-called Iran nuclear conflict, which is more often tilting towards war than a peaceful resolution, has again produced heated debates on its whereabouts. With the bulk of the policy debates endlessly vacillating between a rock (war) and a hard place (sanctions), it is clear that both options will not alleviate concerns for both nuclear proliferation and the Iranian civil society’s well-being. The only meaningful way forward would be to abandon such a bogus policy alternative which has proven counterproductive and will only push the conflict towards the brink of war, and instead striving for regional disarmament and eventually a WMD-free zone. In order to avoid a collision resulting from contentions over nuclear monopoly and deterrence, the creation of such a zone would arguably constitute the only meaningful exit. Hence, the desire to bring both Iran and Israel to the table at the above mentioned UN conference.

While there can be little doubt that civil societies across the region are in need of a prospect for common security and intra-regional cooperation, there can be no less doubt that the so-far preferred policies affecting the region have proven unsuccessful at best. Only in an overall Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) can the concatenation of multi-faceted conflicts in the region be addressed in a sustainable manner. Here, the continuing and increasing insistence from diverse civil society actors will be indispensable to encourage policy-makers to pave the way for bringing sustainable peace and security to the region.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East“, Fair Observer, 2 December;

▪ slightly edited version published as “Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: Searching for a Solution“, openDemocracy,  1 December;

▪ published as “WMD Free Zone: Avoiding a Collision Over Nuclear Monopoly and Deterrence“, Iranian.com, 8 December;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the “Arab Spring” and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Payvand Iran News, 9 December;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the Arab Spring and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Foreign Policy Journal, 9 December ;

▪ published as “A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: An Obligation Imposed by the Arab Spring and the Israel–Iran Conflict“, Iran Review, 9 December;

▪ published as A Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East“, Atlantic Community, Berlin: Atlantische Initiative, 19 January;

▪ republished on Yahanestán: opinión y sociedad sobre Oriente Medio (Mexico), 21 January 2012.

 

Das Sanktionsregime gegen den Iran: Entstehungsgeschichte und Auswirkungen

Sanktionen, ob wirtschaftlicher und/oder politischer Natur, gelten als Instrument zur Erwirkung von Zugeständnissen beim politischen Opponenten. Zumeist wird versucht, dieses Ziel dadurch zu erreichen, dass dem sanktionierten Staat oder der jeweiligen tonangebenden Machtelite das Einkommen beschnitten wird. Um eben jenen Kurswechsel beim Adressaten herbeizuführen, werden Sanktionen im politischen Diskurs zudem als nachgerade gewaltloses, friedliches Mittel dargestellt. In Bezug auf Iran werden gegenwärtig folgende Ziele, die durch Sanktionen zu erreichen seien, proklamiert: Iran soll zu Zugeständnissen zu Gunsten der USA bzw. des Westens gezwungen werden, v.a. im Nuklearstreit, potentiell aber auch bei politischen Fragen in Südwestasien; Irans Atomwaffenfähigkeit soll verhindert werden; die iranische Führung soll geschwächt und die Zivilgesellschaft gestärkt werden.

[…]

 

QUELLE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali (2010) Sanktionsregime gegen den Iran: Entstehung und Auswirkungen” [The Sanctions Regime on Iran: Its Formation and Impacts], inamo: Berichte und Analysen zu Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, Berlin: Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten (inamo), Jg. 16, Nr. 63 (Herbst), S. 33–39.

Das Verhältnis von Religion und Staat in Iran: Von den Safaviden bis heute

 

Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit (1.) der tiefreichenden Verflechtung von Religion und Staat in Iran sowie (2.) der Entstehung einer schiitischen Theokratie sowohl als Ergebnis eines Zusammenstoßes von internen (d.h. politischen, ideologischen, sozialen und ökonomischen) und externen (Imperialismus) Strukturen als auch von kurzfristig zurückliegenden kontingenten historischen Umständen.

[…]

 

QUELLE

Fathollah-Nejad, Ali & Yazdani, Kaveh (2011) “Das Verhältnis von Religion und Staat in Iran: Von den Safaviden bis heute” [The Relationship between Religion and State in Iran: From the Safavids until Today], Zeitschrift für Religion und Gesellschaft, Köln: Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft (forege), Jg. 1, Nr. 2 (Herbst), S. 298–312.

[Die Zeitschrift ist hier zu beziehen.]

 

REAKTIONEN

Die mit dem Düsseldorfer Friedenspreis 2010 ausgezeichnete FriedensTreiberAgentur (FTA) berichtet in ihrem Newsletter Nr. 270/2011 (03.11.2011) von diesem Artikel.

U.S. Policy on Iran under Bush II and Obama

Ali Fathollah-Nejad puts the Iran policy of Barack Obama in perspective by also discussing the ideas of U.S. think-tanks and George W. Bush. He elaborates on his book The Iran Conflict and the Obama Administration: Old Wine in New Skins? [in German], Potsdam University Press, 2010 & 2011 (reprint).

Praise for the book include:
“A detailed and utterly persuasive indictment of US policy towards Iran.”
Dr. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, author of Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic, Hurst 2007 and Columbia University Press 2008;
“[…] read with applause. A very thorough and succinct work. […] nothing important left out.”
Rudolph Chimelli, veteran journalist and Iran expert, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany largest daily newspaper).

 

U.S. policy towards Iran under George W. Bush

What were the main features of the Iran policy of U.S. President George W. Bush?

As we all know, the U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iran was marked by a highly confrontational attitude. The very fact that the Bush/Cheney administration decided to “thank” the Iranian government for its crucial assistance in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by autumn 2001, by naming Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in Bush’s State of the Union address in early 2002, has been a clear indication of the approach preferred towards Iran.

During the Bush II years (but already starting under the Clinton administration), there was tremendous pressure by neoconservative groups outside and inside the administration to effect a “regime change” in Tehran, even to the extent to ask the intelligence services to fabricate evidence for the alleged Iranian “nuclear threat” – stark efforts of political manipulation whose shadows still bear upon the current ties of those institutions as Seymour Hersh describes in his most recent piece on Iran policy for The New Yorker.

The neoconservatives who have been occupying the corridors of power in the first Bush II administration had been able to push through their ideas on how to cope with the Iran problem. These were centred around the principle of not talking to a “rogue state” (which in fact was the basis for the total dismissal of Iran’s “grand bargain” offer in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion o Iraq in spring 2003); an imperial posture that sought to impose a Diktat on Tehran on various topics ranging from the nuclear issue (encapsulated in the legally highly problematic and unrealistic demand for Iran to completely halt its nuclear programme) to regional ones (especially in the U.S. war theatres in Iraq and Afghanistan).

It was already during the second mandate of the Bush/Cheney administration that there was an awakening in some U.S. policy circles about the strategic deficiencies of the confrontational, if not belligerent, approach by Washington not only in the Iran question, but also in other theatres across West Asia. After all, the neoconservative-pushed invasions of Afghanistan (in October 2001) and Iraq (in March 2003) had eliminated Tehran’s immediate foes and thus paved the way for Iran’s increasing regional influence, particularly in post-Saddam Iraq and post-Taliban Afghanistan. Together with the deepening of the “Iraqi quagmire” – not least a result of the strength of the resistance there against the U.S.-led occupation –, by the mid-2000s Iran attained the status of an “indispensable nation” for any kind of strategic arrangements in the region – something the neo-cons in their obsession to aggressively confront Iran had been paradoxically the very enablers thereof. Of course, in the run-up to the war on Iraq, many U.S. Realists had warned about the geopolitical consequences of those invasions, but had been quite ignored.

Finally, the Realist camp’s comeback came with the December 2006 so-called Baker–Hamilton report, which being the first acknowledgement of U.S. policy failures in Iraq and beyond recommended a new approach involving diplomatic openings towards the formerly designated “rogue states” Iran and Syria in the effort to improve the U.S. status in the region.

In other words, before George W. Bush left office, it was clear that his administration’s neoconservative-influenced “don’t talk to Iran” stance has not been producing the desired results. Not only was Iran able – even enabled – to increase its regional standing, but its nuclear programme despite heavy pressures was not halted either. In the 2008 U.S. presidential elections, many presidential candidates tried to capitalize on that failure, among them Barack Obama who on some occasions talked about a new Iran policy approach, thus raising hopes of overcoming his predecessor’s sabre-rattling posture which pushed the world to the brink of another catastrophic war in that region.

However, it is too easily forgotten that the Bush/Cheney administration’s military offensive in the region had in fact enabled the U.S. to establish large, permanent military bases to the immediate east and west of Iran (but of course also in the “Greater Middle East”, in Afghanistan and Central Asia with a view on China), thus making Iran’s military encirclement by the U.S. complete. This situation, including the increasing militarization of the Persian Gulf, to this day nourishes Tehran’s sense of strategic insecurity.

Thus, in a nutshell, the best notion to describe George W. Bush’s Iran policy is “coercive diplomacy”, a term borrowed from Diplomatic Studies, which signals a policy that majorly relies on punitive measures (economic sanctions, political and military pressures) to force concessions from the other side. As such, the coercive strategy totally perverts the notion of diplomacy which only when exercised in “good faith” can bring about satisfying results to the parties involved.

Needless to say that legally this “coercive” approach is highly problematic – to say the least. Not only has the constant threat of war (being a clear violation of the UN Charter which in its Article 2(4) states that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state […]”) been an indispensable feature of the “coercive diplomacy” or “strategy”, but the covert operations in Iran, including acts of sabotage and targeted assassinations to put a brake on the nuclear programme need also mentioning, not least because they still go on.

Policy recommendations regarding Iran by U.S. think-tanks

What policy recommendations have leading think-tanks made regarding Iran?

Against that background, the chance of an Obama Administration formulating a much more even-handed approach towards Iran was the key question, also given the proclaimed need for a “course correction”. I hence studied the various policy recommendation papers being prepared by old and also newly found think-tanks on the Iran question in the transition period between the Bush II and Obama administrations. Here I tried to identify the most important U.S. think-tanks on Iran and wider Middle East issues, and categorize their recommendations, which led me to list them under the following rubrics:

(1) Neoconservatives and liberal hawks favoured the continuation of the “coercive strategy”. This group which among others include the U.S. “Israel Lobby”, with its think-tank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), has de facto been advocating a “roadmap to war” – aptly described by Jim Lobe –, based on the motto of capitulation or war. Still making alarmist assumptions about the Iranian “nuclear threat” and Tehran’s foreign policy goals in general, they still insist that Iran give up nuclear enrichment within an ultimatum, whose ultimate aim would be to legitimize in the eyes of the public the recourse to war. The logic here is very simple: By making unrealistic demands, the failure of any negotiations is wilfully anticipated, which then, according to the BPC, shall open the way for illegal measures such as an economic blockade and a military attack.

WINEP’s Patrick Clawson has summarized the rationale of such an approach as follows: “The principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran. […] The principal target of these offers is American public opinion and world public opinion.” In this context Dennis Ross plays a key role as he has been actively involved in, if not at the forefront of, many Iran policy papers. Ross who is known for his advocacy for Israeli interests in Mideast “peace process” negotiations during the Clinton administration, was in February 2009 first appointed “Special Advisor for the [Persian] Gulf and Southwest Asia” for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then only four months later joined the National Security Council staff as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the “Central Region” (including the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia): Applied to the policy on Iran, his concept of “smart statecraft” stresses the need for “more carrots and more sticks”, very much echoing the approach preferred during the Bush II years, with the “carrots” remaining unspecified, while the “sticks” are being fully deployed. Of course, the Saudi lobby and the wider military-industrial complex ought to be located in this category as well, plus a considerable part of Obama’s administration, including UN Ambassador Susan Rice.

(2) The mainstream élite think-tanks (above all, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) argued for a more (but not exclusively) Realpolitik-based strategy in order to serve U.S. interests in the region, which they believe have not been pursued adequately. They warn against a blind repetition of Bush’s Iran policy which they see as having failed. Instead the U.S. should be ready for engagement with Iran, knowing that this will be time-consuming and arduous. Generally, it is stressed that Iran could be contained, even as a nuclear state.

However, within these “centrist” circles there is a wide range of opinions, even including the “unattractive option” of a preventive strike on Iran, as formulated in an article in CFR’s Foreign Affairs by the Council’s President Richard Haass and the Director of Brookings’ Saban Center for Middle East Policy Martin Indyk.

(3) Moderate circles called for a whole new Iran policy embracing real diplomacy that would also take Iranian security and other interests into account. Countering existing myths about Iranian foreign-policy behaviour (especially when it comes to question of rationality in Tehran’s actions), they make the case for a serious diplomacy and a sustainable engagement with Iran. This group involves many Iran experts and long-standing U.S. diplomats (who e.g. gathered in the American Foreign Policy Project). Indeed they have drawn the right lessons of decades of misleading U.S. policy towards Iran and offer a viable strategy for the future.

U.S. policy towards Iran under Barack Obama

To what extent is President Barack Obama’s Iran policy in line with his predecessor’s policy and the advice of think-tanks?

The conclusion of my study was that it was unlikely to see a change in Washington’s Iran policy under Obama, mainly for the following reasons:

(1) Those advocating the continuation, even deepening of Bush’s “coercive strategy” were clearly very much present. During the Bush II years, neoconservative policy-advising circles had been firmly anchored in the policy debates, foremost when it came to the Iran question – an obsession they shared with the U.S. and Israeli governments – where they had acquired some expertise, albeit a very biased one. This sort of institutionalization in the policy-advising sphere has not disappeared with the new administration. In fact, most neocons and “liberal hawks” approved of Obama’s designations being a proof of his sense for “continuity”, as he not only chose the incumbent Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his hawkish Democratic Party rival Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State (who during the presidential campaign had promised “tough diplomacy” towards Iran), but he also took over Stuart Levey in the Treasury Department, the man who since 2004 had been in charge of firmly internationalizing the sanctions regime, especially in the field of financial sanctions.

(2) The domestic blockade in the U.S. for a change in the Iran policy still remains intact and is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Of course, fundamental changes to the detriment of U.S. interests, above all a success of the Egyptian revolution or change within Saudi Arabia might trigger a radical new strategic thinking in Washington, which might be in line with what Stephen Kinzer is arguing in his Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future (New York: Times Books, 2010), i.e. a strategic reorientation of the U.S. towards Turkey and Iran, and to the detriment of Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, we are not likely to see the latter happening anytime soon, as the Israel Lobby, the military-industrial complex and the Saudi Lobby are all powerful and interconnected politico-economic alliances fighting any prospects for a U.S.–Iranian rapprochement, and more generally favouring a continuation of militaristic policies in the region.

As to how far Obama’s Iran policy is in line with the advice of think-tanks as discussed above, we can foremost mention the still dominant belief in the U.S. – shared by most think-tanks – that Iran must halt its nuclear programme and be deprived of nuclear material for building a bomb. When the nuclear talks were resumed by autumn 2009 around the issue of providing the Tehran Research Reactor with the needed 20% enriched uranium for medical purposes, such a stance informed Washington’s strategy aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear break-out capability. This goal then failed in the face of Tehran’s insistence on a simultaneous swap of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) against that higher enriched one. In brief, the talks ultimately failed as a result of Washington’s miscalculated assumption that it could strike a deal which would ship the bulk of Iran’s nuclear material – in fact Tehran’s bargaining chip in its talks with great powers – outside the country.

(3) The more general point is the continuing reliance on the “coercive strategy” – or in the language of major powers, the “dual-track approach” – which is still heavily based on the imposition of punitive measures, above all economic and financial sanctions, in the case Iran does not comply with long-established demands such as the halt of the nuclear programme. Now with Russia and China also benefitting from the sanctions regime against Iran, the continuation of that strategy is being favoured. This was starkly witnessed in the negative reactions by all the UN veto powers to the Brazil- and Turkey-brokered deal with Iran on 17 May 2010, basically pointing out that the Iran issue had to be dealt with within the UN Security Council. Three weeks later, the latest round of tightened UN sanctions was imposed on Iran. Hence, for now we are still inside the vicious circle inherent to the “coercive strategy”, in which it seems more and more actors are finding their niches to profit from.

As a result, by June 2010, the Iran expert of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray Takeyh, observed that “[…] the strategy has shifted from conciliation to coercion.” Given the improbability of that strategy to succeed, I think it is high time for the West to contemplate about an Iran policy beyond sanctions, which has not only cemented the positions of hardliners on all sides, but also block any advancement in the diplomatic stand-off and on wider regional issues of crucial importance to all parties involved.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “U.S. Policy on Iran under Bush II and Obama”, Interview by Leonhardt van Efferink (Editor of ExploringGeopolitics), published on :

Iran Review, 20 September;

Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, as “From Bush to Obama: US Policy Towards Iran“, 20 September;

Iranian Diplomacy, as “Iran: Barack Obama, Encirclement, Dual-Track Approach“, 25 September.

 

REACTIONS

Safdari, Cyrus (2011) “US Policy on Iran: The Truth is Emerging“, Iran Affairs: Iranian Foreign Policy and International Affairs, 5 October.

New Insights Into the Islamic Republic of Iran

 

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is considered a defining moment because the Islamic Republic replaced an authoritarian monarchy that was friendly to the West. The revolution, moreover, linked religion to politics in an unprecedented way. Books by Hamid Dabashi, Elaheh Rostami-Povey and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam discuss the country’s history and its influence beyond its own borders.

Arguably the most important reason for the international interest in Iran is its strategically pivotal geography. Like some of its Muslim neighbours, it has tremendous oil and gas reserves. For the United States, the revolution in Iran was nothing less than a geopolitical shock.

Revolutionary dynamics in the Arab World have recently rekindled the debate in the West on “political Islam”. To get a good understanding of the phenomenon, however, it is necessary to define it properly – which, so far, has hardly been done.

The issue is generally approached from two directions. The cultural-essentialist or Orientalistic school holds that Islam determines political, economic and social realities. Orientalists argue that the entire Muslim world is not only somehow monolithic, but even downright resistant to change. Samuel Huntington’s book “The clash of civilizations” is a prominent expression of such thinking. This school is not alone in emphasising religion as the single most important defining feature of society, Islamist fundamentalists say so too.

The competing school emphasises structural aspects that have evolved in history. Its analyses take a wide range of factors into account, namely socio-economic conditions, political trends, historical change, class conflict and revolutions.

The current Arab Spring has dealt the Orientalist school a severe blow, and may yet discredit it once and for all. Obviously, there is a widespread desire in Muslim societies for change, and the revolutionary motivation is not primarily rooted in faith. Rather, the desire for universal freedoms and social justice is making itself heard in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere.

The books about Iran discussed here do not belong to the Orientalist camp. Nonetheless, each author assesses the topic from a different angle.

Struggle for democracy

In “Iran: a people interrupted” (2007), Hamid Dabashi analyses nearly 200 years of history from the literary-intellectual and political perspectives. The author takes his readers on a trip through time, revisiting major historical events. With unparalleled eloquence, he argues that Iranians have been fighting for democracy and against “foreign and domestic tyranny” for more than a century. Dabashi says the anti-colonial Tobacco Revolt at the end of the 19th century, the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the 20th, the nationalisation of the oil sector under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s and the “Islamic Revolution” at the end of the 1970s were the most important steps in this process.

He disagrees with the notion of Iran being caught between tradition and modernity, calling it a “fabricated paradox”. Instead, he argues that since the 19th century an “anti-colonial modernity” marked by the struggle against both domestic and foreign oppression has defined Iranians’ emancipatory experience.

Dabashi traces three major ideological formations back to the multicultural, pluralistic Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century: liberal-democratic nationalism, social-democratic socialism and theocratic Islamism. In his view, these three ideological formations do not necessarily clash. Rather, they all have their roots in the anti-colonial struggle and serve as catalysts for one other.

In the early 20th century, the idea of the modern nation-state with the notion of citizenship took shape, including both women and religious minorities, with relevant roles for a free press and intellectuals. However, it was never fully realised because of the repression of a series of Shah regimes which were allied to colonial and imperial powers. These ideals have yet to materialise.

Dabashi sees Shia Islam as inherently oppositional in its political focus. Accordingly, a dilemma arises when Shia clerics assume state power and get corrupted by it – which is what happened in the Islamic Republic.

Dabashi assesses the role of Shia religious leaders in the context of Iran’s political development. He makes a distinction between progressive clerics who oppose unjust rule and conservative ones who are closely connected to power or strive for it. In doing so, he shows that Shia clerics in Iran do not form a monolithic block. As is evident today, some important leaders sympathise with the democracy movement, and many are not pleased with the increasingly militaristic system that was set up in the name of religion.

A wide range of voices

In “Iran’s influence: a religious-political state and society in its region” (2010), Elaheh Rostami-Povey quotes a wide range of contemporary voices – journalists, refugees, expatriates and researchers from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. She conducted her interviews with Muslim modernists, secular leftists, nationalists and feminists from 2007 to 2009. She shows that all of them demand democracy and liberty.

Her book is an encyclopaedic discussion of the political dynamics within the religious-political state of Iran. She shows that its internal contradictions have fostered the growth of a new democratic movement, which calls the regime, but not religion as such, into question.

At the same time, she demonstrates why the Iranian state’s foreign policy has found approval in the region where a majority of the public identifies with Iran’s stance against the USA, Israel and the “war on terror”. One reason for the popularity of criticism voiced by Tehran is that many Arab autocracies cooperate with Washington, and open debate has been impossible so far.

Rostami-Povey emphasises the wide range of manifestations of “political Islam”, each of which has to be considered in its specific historical and socio-political context. She writes that Islamists in Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its associated organisations or Hamas in Palestine are all quite different, and all are struggling with their own internal contradictions. However, all varieties of Islamism have one thing in common: they mobilise popular support by opposing imperialism and Zionism.

Rostami-Povey warns that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” prevents us from seeing the diversity of various Islamisms. As she puts it, “homogenisation and essentialism” make us blind to dynamics of change and thus promote Orientalism and Islamophobia. She argues that, ultimately, the West’s ongoing hostility towards Iran and Islamist movements only strengthens those conservative forces.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam comes to similar conclusions in “Iran in world politics: the question of the Islamic Republic” (2007). He has worked up an intricate theory on the interaction between society, culture and state institutions. As he puts it, “counter-hegemonic utopias” – such as Marxism, Communism, Maoism and Islamism – radically changed Iran’s political culture in the 1960s. The revolution therefore pursued “utopian-romantic” ideals, which left their mark on the Islamic Republic’s institutionalised norms and still affect its approach to foreign policy.

He emphasises the constant possibility of change in the Islamic Republic as a result of an “active counterculture”. He shows that the picture US neo-conservatives paint of Iran is perverted and calls for “critical Iranian studies” which would pluralise the ways one sees Iran and dissect the international politics surrounding the country.

These three books by noted scholars lay the foundation for a better understanding of Iran and “political Islam”. They theoretically and empirically assess the context in its entire complexity. Without such comprehensive knowledge, Western understanding cannot add up to more than biased knee-jerk reactions. The books show that political trends do not come about in a vacuum, but rather are rooted in complex settings with domestic and foreign social, economic and political factors. The idea of a “monolithic Islam” is not only wrong – it is dangerous.

 

Books reviewed:

  • Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic, London: Hurst 2007 & New York: Columbia University Press 2008.
  • Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted, New York: New Press 2007.
  • Elaheh Rostami-Povey, Iran’s Influence: A Religious–Political State and Society in its Region, London & New York: Zed Books 2010.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2011) “New Insights Into the Islamic Republic of Iran“, Development and Cooperation (D+C), Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation, GIZ), Vol. 52, No. 5 (May), pp. 208–209.

▪ republished on Europe’s World, 22/05/2011;

▪ republished on Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 22/05/2011;

▪ republished on e-International Relations (e-IR), 22/02/2011;

▪ republished on Monthly Review Webzine, 23/05/2011;

▪ republished as Defining Moment on Iranian.com, 23/05/2011;

▪ republished on Atlantic-Community.org, 24/05/2011;

▪ republished on Humanitarian Texts: World-Wide Asian–Eurasian Human Rights Forum, 25/05/2011;

▪ republished on ZNet, 31/05/2011;

AUF DEUTSCH | “Neue Blicke auf die Islamische Republik Iran“, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (E+Z), Vol. 52, No. 5 (May), pp. 208–209;

▪ republished on ZNet Deutschland, 15/06/2011.

SLOVENČINA | “Čo je to politický islam?“, trans. Peter Nedoroščík, utopia, 01/07/2011.

The ‘Middle East’: From Past and Present Attributions to a Future Regional Identity?

ABSTRACT

The south-western part of the Asian continent, an area spanning from the Levant to the Hindu Kush and from the Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula, is widely – in political, public and even academic discourses alike – referred to as the ‘Near and/or Middle East’. Such thetic denomination of that geographical space has been subjected to exogenous attributions based upon cultural, political and strategic considerations by colonial and imperial powers. Due to the interest-driven and hence arbitrary nature, its boundaries have constantly been altered in the colonial/imperial mind map. However superficial those outside markers are, they tend to shape the reality of that region – and thus to create a political geography. Through imperial incursions and on-going military presence the prescribed politico–strategic framework has imposed itself onto the region.

Beyond those representations, shared cultural values and historical experiences might provide a basis for an endogenously designed future, potentially able to overcome the partitions the region suffers from on multiple levels. Thus, besides tracing the changing ‘political geographies’, the paper proposes a realistic utopia. It aims to de-colonize the ‘Middle East’ through a critical history of the region and embraces a regionalization process. Thus it pro-actively engages with the challenges posed by the imperially designed past and present.

Read the whole document here (pdf).

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “The ‘Middle East’: From Past and Present Attributions to a Future Regional Identity?“, Polyvocia: SOAS Journal of Graduate Research, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, Vol. 2 (Spring), pp. 3–20.

Interview with Giovanni Arrighi (Berlin, 2005)


The interview with Giovanni Arrighi below was conducted on 12 November 2005, at the Kapitalismus Reloaded” international conference held in Berlin.  It is published in English here today to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Arrighi’s death.

A. Fathollah-Nejad (AFN): Does the West have to fear China?

G. Arrighi (GA): I don’t think so.  I mean I think that there is no question that the Chinese are sincere when they say that they are for a peaceful ascent, that they are against hegemony. [. . .]  I think that’s also part of the Chinese tradition. [. . .]  On the basis of a very simple calculation, China has nothing to gain by being militarily aggressive and everything to lose.  The only thing it [the West — AFN] has to fear is the redistribution of power, and there’s no reason why this should translate into an aggressive China.

AFN: What about the rest of the world?  Would it have a better outcome with a Far Eastern hegemony led by China?

GA: Well, the Chinese doesn’t want to talk about hegemony.  But let’s put it this way: I think that the rest of the world, particularly the South — but also the North — should be better off with a multipolar world, where economically there isn’t just one locomotive like the United States but there are more than one.  And at this moment, certainly in East Asia — including Japan — it is the Chinese who are driving the recovery and keeping the expansion going on.  So I think the rest of the world is probably better off.  But the qualification is that this would be more the case if the Chinese don’t imitate the energy-wasting and energy-consuming pattern of consumption of the West.  If they develop more or less a sort of energy-saving kind of techniques, then that would be the best.  Who knows!

AFN: The greatest obstacle to Far Eastern hegemony seems to be the absence of a Sino-Japanese partnership.  Is this realistic in the future?

GA: It’s very hard to tell.  I mean both the Chinese and the Japanese have always privileged a kind of alliance or relationship with the United States than one between each other.  But again, it depends on what the United States will do in the Far East. [. . .]  Japan will go along with an aggressive U.S. stance towards the continuing Chinese growth.  So it’s possible, but for now it’s not likely; maybe it can be more likely in the future.

AFN: What does the dispossessed South have to do to change its present situation?

GA: I think the most important thing is to create and strengthen South-South links.  They don’t need to de-link from the North, they just have to strengthen mutual links and go on operat[ing] — what they are already doing [. . .] more or less — and that will probably change the situation in the South.

AFN: Some say that now there are a lot of tensions among Western countries when it comes to imperialism.  Others say that imperialism is for the sake of stabilization of their joint world domination.  What is your favorite argument?

GA: I don’t think that they are any dangers of so-called inter-imperialist rivalries between the United States and Europe.  The question is really how Europe and the United States — jointly or separately — relate to the South and the East: whether they accommodate the emergence of new so-called poles and powers, or whether they want to keep things as they are.  Because that’s probably the most dangerous thing: the attempt to [. . .] prevent economic rise of China. [. . .]  This can only lead to military adventures worse than Iraq.

AFN: Thank you very much.

Giovanni Arrighi (7 July 1937 – 18 June 2009) was Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Global Studies in Culture, Power and History at Johns Hopkins University.  Among his many publications are The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times; Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (with Beverly J. Silver); The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 And 50 Year Perspectives; Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century; “Hegemony Unraveling-I”; and “Hegemony Unraveling-II.”

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Interview with Giovanni Arrighi (Berlin, 2005)“, Monthly Review Webzine, 18 June.

 

Germany’s Finkelstein Phobia

Renowned scholar and descendent of Holocaust survivors prevented by German Israel Lobby to speak about Gaza

Norman Finkelstein, an internationally renowned scholar of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, was due to talk about the state of the decades-old conflict and the situation in Gaza one year after the Israeli assault last week in Munich and Berlin. As part of a European speaking tour which would have led him to Germany for the first time since 2002, Finkelstein has been invited to speak in Prague at a number of prestigious institutions, such as the Institute of International Relations Prague, the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts at Charles University in Prague.

 

One of Finkelstein’s Berlin lectures was initially planned to be sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, an institution affiliated to the German Green Party. The event was scheduled to take place at the Protestant Trinitatis Church. In a statement announcing its decision to cancel the event, the church “regrets to have been implicated, against its will and its publicly known stances, in anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli polemics”. Soon thereafter, on 9 February, the Böll Foundation announced its pullback stating “Due to inattention, insufficient investigation and trust in our cooperation partners, we have made a severe mistake. In our judgment, Finkelstein’s behavior and his theses do not remain within the limits of legitimate critique.” It finally „thanked the many notes and interventions pertaining to this event.”

The other Finkelstein lecture was scheduled at the headquarters of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS), a German institution affiliated to the Left Party. But on 17 February, the Left Party think-tank also withdrew its support. It stated to have underestimated the event’s “political explosiveness”, saying further that for the sake of guaranteeing a “controversial and pluralistic debate” its proposition to provide for a counterpart to Finkelstein has been rejected by the organizers. Aside from the unusual insistence to invite a “counterpart”, Doris Pumphrey from the organizing committee stated that the RLS had not wanted to name this counterpart.

Finkelstein’s projected two lectures in Munich, one of them at the America House Munich, were likewise cancelled.

The German Israel Lobby and the Anti-Semitism Claim

The wave of cancellations came after a concerted campaign by neoconservative and pro-Israeli pressure groups, such as Honestly Concerned and BAK Shalom, which are known for their unconditional support of Israeli policies and the defamation of critics as anti-Semites. BAK Shalom, a pro-Zionist working group within the Left Party’s youth organization, was one of the main drivers behind the campaign to cancel Finkelstein’s public lectures. A statement, signed by BAK Shalom offshoots and like-minded groupings, reads that “Finkelstein is internationally popular among anti-Semites” while accusing him – a “self-proclaimed historian” – of “historical revisionism” and “anti-Semitism.”

Finkelstein, whose parents were survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto and of Nazi concentration camps, was awarded a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University and is the author of many academic books on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. His Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict (1995; 2003) has received much praise from eminent scholars such as Oxford University professor Avi Shlaim (“a major contribution to the study of the Arab–Israeli conflict”) and leading intellectual Noam Chomsky (“the most revealing study of the historical background of the conflict and the current peace agreement”). In 2007, after a denunciation campaign with the involvement of Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, despite academic approval he was denied tenure at Chicago’s DePaul University where he has been teaching. Dershowitz’ book The Case for Israel, whose scholarly integrity has been highly disputed by Finkelstein and others, has been publicized by BAK Shalom. Dershowitz has also called Finkelstein “a classic anti-Semite”.

McCarthyism à l’Israélienne vs. Jewish Humanism

 

Finkelstein has repeatedly argued for a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict according to international legal prescriptions and rulings while stressing that the lesson he learned from his family’s Holocaust suffering was to call attention to the Palestinians’ plight. His new book entitled This Time We Went Too Far: Truth and Consequences of the Gaza Invasion (OR Books) will be published in mid-March.

In a response to the pro-Israel lobbying groups, Professor Rolf Verleger, chair of the German section of the European Jews for a Just Peace (EJJP) – one of the sponsors of the Berlin lectures – rejected the claims put forward against Finkelstein. Instead, Verleger described him as “a proud and conscious Jew, who defends himself against the appropriation of Jewish tradition by Jewish blood-and-soil nationalism”. Criticizing those pressure groups for their lack of opposition to human rights violations and nationalism when it came to Israel, Verleger compared their tactics to McCarthyite agitation, this time directed against “un-Israeli activities”.

Verleger, who is the author of Israel’s Wrong Way: A Jewish View (PapyRossa, in German, 2nd edn., 2009), is a former member of the board of delegates of the Central Council of Jews in Germany but was not re-elected due to his open criticism of Israeli policies.

In a letter sent earlier to the Trinitatis Church in a plea to reverse its decision, Verleger rejected the idea that criticism of Israel’s policies would amount to anti-Semitism and instead talked of “Jewish responsibility” to do so. Verleger, who in the letter reminded that his father had died on the very day of the projected Finkelstein event in Berlin 45 years ago with an “Auschwitz number on his arm” and who had lost his family in Auschwitz, consigned Finkelstein to stand in the “humanistic tradition of German Judaism” à la Martin Buber, Hannah Arendt and Rabbi Leo Baeck.

 

Leftist Raison d’Etat

 

In particular, the withdrawal of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) engendered ongoing protests. In an open letter some Left Party Members of Parliament and leading sympathizers criticized the foundation’s handling of Norman Finkelstein. Therein, they consider the denunciatory claims against Finkelstein as “absurd”. In another open letter, former and current RLS scholarship holder conclude that the foundation might lose its “character as location for Leftist debates and controversies” if it were to continue to avoid criticism of Israeli government policies. Also many other Leftists voiced criticism of the RLS’s decision noting that the latter would be unworthy of the Jewish philosopher and activist Rosa Luxemburg’s famous quote of “Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently.”

 

The RLS had come under harsh criticism last summer when allowing three well-known war-mongers – amongst them a leading representative from BAK Shalom – to speak at its largest students-led annual conference. The Left Party and its think-tank find themselves in an internal strife on the question of anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism, not at least since the chairman of the party’s parliamentary group Gregor Gysi advocated in spring 2008 to reconsider those principles. This was seen as an effort to align the Left Party with German raison d’état. In a speech before the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) in March 2008, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had said: “Here of all places I want to explicitly stress that every German Government and every German Chancellor before me has shouldered Germany’s special historical responsibility for Israel’s security. This historical responsibility is part of my country’s raison d’être. For me as German Chancellor, therefore, Israel’s security will never be open to negotiation.” Displaying “unconditional solidarity” with Israeli policies, two days into Tel Aviv’s military operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, the German Chancellor and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert “agreed that the responsibility for the development of the situation in the region clearly and exclusively lies with Hamas.” Such an assessment had also been echoed then by the chairman of the Left Party in Berlin at a pro-Israel rally.

After the cancellations of venues for Finkelstein’s lectures, at the end the junge Welt (“Young World”) – an independent left-wing daily known for its staunch opposition to illegal wars – had stepped in by offering its rather small-spaced shop in Berlin.

 

Finally, in a statement issued on 20 February, Finkelstein explained why he would not travel to Germany: “Some Germans seem determined that their fellow German citizens only hear opinions on the Israel-Palestine conflict that support the policies of the Israeli government. Such intolerance is not good for Palestinians who are living under a brutal military occupation. It is not good for Germans who want their country to support human rights and international law. It is not good for courageous dissenting Israelis who need support from the European Union.”

Finkelstein was also going to elaborate on the Goldstone Report, commissioned by the United Nations, which finds Israel guilty of war crimes in its assault on Gaza during the winter of 2008-2009. Further, in violation of domestic and EU laws that would prohibit the selling of arms to conflict-torn regions, Berlin has been continuing to do so.

Precedents of Handling Critics of Israeli Policies

There have been a number of occasions most recently in Germany where critics of Israel’s policies have been faced with comparable treatment. In January this year, three female Left Party members of the German Parliament (who also signed the above mentioned open letter to the RLS) had been attacked by similar groups in concert with Evangelical clerics for not offering standing ovations after Israeli President Shimon Peres’ Bundestag speech on Holocaust Memorial Day. The parliamentarians, who had paid tribute to the victims of Nazi crimes at ceremonies ahead of Peres’ talk, explained their rejection by pointing to the Israeli President’s exploitation of the event for a pro-Iran war call. In his speech, Peres considered Iran’s government to be “a danger to the entire world”. In spite of ongoing Israeli calls for a military strike on Iran, the Israeli President also said “we identify with the millions of Iranians who revolt against dictatorship and violence.” The German section of the EJJP had criticized the invitation of Peres in the first place.

In early 2009, a projected discussion on Germany’s major political TV show “Anne Will” about the Israeli military offensive in Gaza was cancelled only a few days before, in what was considered to have occurred after political interference.

In October 2009, following a lobbying campaign similar to the Finkelstein case, a projected talk in Munich by the exiled Israeli historian Ilan Pappé was cancelled by the city’s authorities. In an open letter, Professor Pappé – who was then speaking at a different venue – wrote that his father “was silenced in a similar way as a German Jew in the early 1930s”. Like himself, he went on, his father and his friends were regarded as “’humanists’ and ‘peacenik’ Jews whose voice had to be quashed and stopped”. Pappé said he was “worried, as any decent person should be, about the state of freedom of speech and democracy in present day Germany” as witnessed by the decision to censor his talk.

Both Finkelstein and Pappé have authored leading studies on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and are considered as eloquent advocates for a just and legal settlement of the conflict. Their Jewish background makes them especially troublesome for hardline defenders of Israel who frequently resort to labeling critics of being anti-Semites or even “self-hating Jews”. One might argue that such a distinction between “good” and “bad” Jews would in itself amount to a sort of anti-Semitism.

 

Update | Norman Finkelstein’s projected talk at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic on “Prospects of Peace in the Middle East, Current Situation and the Goldstone Report on Gaza” was cancelled by the Academy on very short notice.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Germany’s Fear of Finkelstein”, The Palestine Chronicle, 2 March

republished on Eurasia Review, 02/03

republished on uruknet.info, 02/03

republished on CounterCurrents.org, 03/03

republished on Information Clearing House, 03/03

▪ republished as “Germany’s Finkelstein Phobia” on Pacific Free Press, 04/03

▪ republished as “Silencing Critics of Israel: Germany’s Finkelstein Phobia”, Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 04/03

republished on INCnews Global Intelligence, 04/03

republished on Political Theatrics, 04/03

slightly edited version published on Monthly Review Webzine, 01/03 (top story of 1 & 2 Mar.)

▪ republished on the website of Jews for Justice for Palestinians (JFJFP), 10/03.

IN FRENCH |Finkelstein fiche la trouille à une certaine Allemagne”, trans. M. Charbonnier, Palestine – Solidarité, 04/03

republished as “La phobie Finkelstein en Allemagne“, Mondialisation.ca, Montreal: Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation, 04/03

republished as “L’Allemagne a peur de Finkelstein“, trans. M. Charbonnier, edit. F. Giudice, Tlaxcala, 05/03.

IN ITALIAN |Zittire i critici di Israele: La fobia della Germania de Norman Finkelstein“, Arianna Editrice, trans. A. Carancini, 07/03

republished on Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 08/03.

IN CZECH |Německé obavy z Finkelsteina a umlčování kritiky Izraele”, Outsider Media, 08/03.

IN JAPANESE | In excerpts.

About the article | “Germany’s Finkelstein Phobia” by Ali Fathollah-Nejad touches on the background of a series of cancellations of projected talks by the renowned scholar on the Israel/Palestine conflict Norman Finkelstein in Germany.

Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions on Iran | Unkluge Kollateralschäden „smarter Sanktionen“ | Les dommages collatéraux des « sanctions ciblées »

PRAISE

»excellent« (Noam Chomsky)

 

For French and German versions, please scroll down.

The prospects for democracy, socio-economic development, and conflict resolution will suffer if the West continues to rely on punitive measures

This time, the warmongers’silly season found its apogée in U.S. neo-conservative Daniel Pipes’ advice to Obama to “bomb Iran,” which appeared shortly after Tony Blair, having outlined why he helped invade Iraq, remarked ominously, “We face the same problem about Iran today.” The Chilcot Inquiry in the United Kingdom on how the Iraq War was launched ironically coincided with a considerable military build-up in the Persian Gulf region. All this occurred amidst the continued struggle of Iran’s civil rights movement and proclamations of Western leaders to be in support of the latter’s efforts. But is there any evidence for this?

In contradistinction to war, sanctions are widely portrayed as necessary, almost healthy medicine to bring about change in the opponent’s policies. However, as the history of the West–Iran conflict proves, sanctions have rather the state of crisis alive than contributed to its resolution. Nonetheless, Western governments do not seem to have lost their dubious fascination for them.

As the call for “crippling sanctions” became morally questionable when last summer the impressive Green wave shook the streets of Tehran for fear of wrecking the same, today the benign sounding “smart” or “targeted” sanctions are on the tip of everyone’s tongue. Yet, a close look reveals a great deal of wishful thinking as to the effects of such sanctions.

Gigantic dimensions of “smart sanctions”

“Smart sanctions”, it is claimed, are a magic wand with which to decapitate evil. In the Iranian case, evil is being identified with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Originally a defense organization erected to counter Iraqi aggression in the 1980s, the Guardians have developed into an expansive socio-politico-economic conglomerate which is believed to possess unrivalled economic and political power in today’s Islamic Republic.

As we are told, “smart sanctions” shall target the Guardians’ grip on the Iranian power structure. The much neglected difficulty here – though it is widely acknowledged that the bulk of Iranian economy is now in the hands of the Guardians – is that in the end millions of civilians connected to these wide-ranging sectors thought to be controlled by the Guardians will be affected. Seen in this light, the gigantic dimension of these alleged “smart sanctions” comes to the fore.

Moreover, so-called “crippling sanctions” that target petrol supply to Iran are still en route. In anticipation of those U.S. unilateral sanctions, the world’s largest insurance companies have announced their retreat from Iran. This concerns both the financial and shipping sectors, and affects petrol supplies to Iran which imports 40 percent of its needs. Also three giant oil traders ended supplies to Iran, which amounted to half of Tehran’s imports. Needless to say, such sanctions ultimately harm the population. To add, a complete implementation thereof – i.e. preventing Asian competitors to step in – would require a naval blockade which amounts to an act of war.

Crippling the ordinary population

As stressed by civil society figures and economists, the price of sanctions is being paid by the Iranian population at large. The Iranian economy – manufacturing, agriculture, bank and financial sectors etc. – has been hurt from almost three decades of sanctions. Even today, businesses cannot easily obtain much needed goods on the international market to continue production and must often pay above-standard prices. Moreover, the scientific community has faced discrimination in areas of research as has Iran’s technological advances been slowed down.

Reflecting the dangers sanctions pose to the Green Movement, last fall Mir-Hossein Mousavi stated: “We are opposed to any types of sanctions against our nation.” The same was recently uttered by his fellow opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi in an interview with Corriere della Serra.

Meanwhile a more fundamental problem remains – hardly acknowledged by many proponents who succumb to the adventurous illusion of having a say in the design and implementation of sanctions: They are mainly designed by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), introduced to the U.S. Congress and finally implemented by the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Leveyan AIPAC confidant. Along this process, the potential suffering by Iran’s civil society hardly plays a role.

Sanctions – either “crippling” or “smart” – ultimately harm ordinary citizens. “Smart sanctions” is as much of an oxymoron as “smart weapons” which supposedly by “surgical strikes” only take out evil components. Indeed, much as in the case of their militaristic brothers-in-sprit, in the end the “collateral damages” of “smart sanctions” remain dominant.

A futile political instrument in today’s world

More generally, in an increasingly multipolar globalized world, sanctions imposed upon energy-rich countries are basically futile as an effective policy tool. Too numerous are business-driven actors that are only too happy to jump in. Thus, Chinese, Russian, and even U.S. companies (acting via Dubai) have hugely benefitted from the European, U.S.-pressured withdrawal from the Iranian market.

Thus, sanctions – a medicine with which Western policy-circles are so obsessed with – are not a cure but a slow poison applied to the civil society and thus the civil rights movement. Sanctions as prototype of economic warfare in concert with the seasonal flaring-up of war-mongering are a dangerous mix. The deafening “drums of war” continue to bang upon the beating heart of Iran’s civil society.

Sanctions and threats of war: Poisonous for democratic development

All this suggests that sanctions are perhaps a fig leaf for other agendas. For, in contrast to Western proclamations, sanctions do harm the civil society while cementing the position of hardliners. Iran’s middle class as a result will be affected by this further isolation of the country as sanctions punish honest traders and reward corrupt ones. The Guardians with their assumed 60 harbors at the Persian Gulf control the bulk of imports and sanctions will only bolster the trend of flourishing “black channels”.

One might indeed argue that the not-so-unconscious “collateral damage” of never-ending sanctions is any meaningful transition to more democracy in Iran – a prospect which would set an uncomfortable precedent for the West’s authoritarian friends in the region.

What next: “Surgical strikes” or serious diplomacy?

At the very least, the unending story of sanctions bears testimony to Western leaders’ commitment to uphold “credibility” in the face of adverse conditions as much as to imposing their will on Iran. A futile exercise – even a dangerous one – if one begins to contemplate the aftermath of “smart sanctions” being imposed: Will the next desperate move entail “surgical strikes”?

Instead of going on believing that sanctions will one day develop their desired effects, it is high time to put the brakes. Hence, the only way forward would be to adopt a set of policies that would disarm hardliners of all sides whose business flourishes in the vicious cycle of enmity. It is only by détente that grist to the mills of radicalism can be removed – and a sustainable de-militarization of Iranian politics attained. Revoking existing sanctions on goods for civilian use could work wonders that would shake the very fundaments of confrontational postures.

Despite all frivolous claims, the diplomatic route has not been exhausted. Indeed, we are far from it. Since the core problem remains the “security dilemma” in the region, it would be wise for the West to call upon Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The transatlantic “coercive strategy” vis-à-vis Iran – as it is accurately described in Diplomatic Studies – must be suspended for it undermines prospects for peace and development towards democracy.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions on Iran“, Informed Comment, guest editorial, 12 March;

▪ republished as “Collateral Damage of Iran Sanctions“, The ColdType Reader, No. 46 (May), pp. 56–57;

republished on Monthly Review Webzine, 12/03;

republished on Europe’s World, 15/03;

republished on Payvand Iran News, 16/03;

republished on e-International Relations (e-IR), 19/04

▪ republished as “How Smart are Sanctions?“, Iranian.com, 15/03;

▪ republished as “Sanctions on Iran: What are the Implications?“, Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 16/03;

▪ abridged version published as “Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions“, Truthout, op-ed, 23/03.

IN CZECH |Jaké jsou důsledky sankcí na Írán?“, trans. P. Kreuz, Eastbound.cz, 17/03.

 

REACTIONS

Armen Gabrielian (2010) ‘US Collusion with Saddam Hussein and Effects of Humanitarian Sanctions on Iraq‘, Examiner.com (U.S.), 5 April:

“As President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton and most member of the US Congress vociferously demand the imposition of new sanctions on Iran on a daily basis, it is instructive to review the history of the relationship between the US and Iran and to study what the effect of the new sanctions might be. The new sanctions are purported to be ‘smart sanctions’ and ‘crippling sanctions.’ However, as noted in a report entitled, ‘Collateral Damages of Smart Sanctions on Iran‘, such sanctions will most likely hurt the ordinary people of Iran, not its repressive Government leaders. Even the key champions of the so-called green movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have stated publicly that they are opposed to any new sanctions on Iran. In an earlier era, during the Clinton Administration, a similar idea was proposed and implemented through the UN Oil-for-Food Program. […]”

 

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Les dommages collatéraux des « sanctions ciblées » contre l’Iran

En s’obstinant à infliger des « sanctions ciblées» à l’Iran, l’Occident assombrit les perspectives de démocratisation, de développement économique et de résolution des conflits

Le retour saisonnier, sur la scène internationale, des bellicistes a culminé début février avec l’injonction à bombarder l’Iran du « néocon » Daniel Pipes à Barack Obama « afin de sauver sa présidence ». Peu auparavant Tony Blair avait encore glissé, lors de son exposé sur les raisons ayant justifié l’intervention militaire de son pays en Irak, une phrase inquiétante : « nous sommes aujourd’hui face au même problème en Iran ». Ainsi, il a prononcé pas moins de 58 fois le nom « Iran » lors de cette allocution. La commission « Chilcot »  en Grande Bretagne, enquêtant sur les évènements liés à la guerre en Irak, a cyniquement coïncidé avec un important renforcement militaire américain dans la région du golfe Persique. Et pour finir, il a été rapporté que des centaines de bombes anti-bunker avaient été embarquées en Californie à destination de l’île de Diego Garcia dans l’océan Indien, d’où étaient parties les deux dernières attaques aériennes contre l’Irak. Tout cela a exactement coïncidé avec la poursuite de la lutte du mouvement iranien pour les droits civiques et les proclamations des hommes politiques occidentaux qu’ils soutenaient celle-là. Mais quelles preuves existe-t-il de cela ?

Contrairement à la guerre, les sanctions sont très largement présentées comme un remède nécessaire et franchement salubre, permettant de pousser un adversaire politique à changer de cap. Cependant l’évolution du conflit irano-occidental prouve que les sanctions ont pérennisé la crise plutôt que de contribuer à en sortir. En dépit de cela, les gouvernements occidentaux semblent toujours en proie à une véritable fascination pour des sanctions.

L’appel initial à des « sanctions paralysantes » s’est tu dans un premier temps l’été dernier, lorsqu’une impressionnante vague « verte » a déferlé dans les rues de Téhéran, non pas en dernier lieu par crainte de « paralyser » cette dernière. Mais aujourd’hui de telles sanctions sont sur toutes les lèvres. On accole simplement aux mesures punitives désormais envisagées des adjectifs lénifiants tels  qu’« avisées » ou « ciblées». En y regardant de plus près, on s’aperçoit qu’on prend en fait largement ses désirs pour des réalités.

Le gigantesque impact de « sanctions ciblées »

Des « sanctions avisées » seraient, prétend-on, un remède miracle pour décapiter le mal. Dans le cas iranien, le mal est désormais identifié avec le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique. À l’origine créés pour défendre le pays contre l’agression irakienne dans les années 80, les Gardiens se sont transformés en un conglomérat expansif socio-politico-économique auxquels on attribue un pouvoir hors pair dans la République islamique actuelle.

On maintient que les « sanctions avisées » devraient affecter de manière ciblée la position des Gardiens au sein de la structure du pouvoir iranien. On néglige cependant la conséquence logique du fait qu’une grande partie de l’économie iranienne est aux mains des Gardiens : ce sont les millions de civils et leurs familles dont le revenu d’existence est lié aux vastes secteurs de l’économie détenus par les Gardiens qui seraient avant tout atteints. On devine alors l’ampleur gigantesque d’une démarche prétendument ponctuelle de telles mesures punitives.

Les prétendues « sanctions paralysantes », qui doivent limiter en  premier lieu les livraisons d’essence à l’Iran, sont actuellement en préparation aux Etats-Unis. Dans l’attente de ces sanctions unilatérales américaines les plus grandes compagnies mondiales d’assurances ont déjà annoncé leur retrait d’Iran. De même, les principaux fournisseurs mondiaux d’essence qui couvraient encore récemment la moitié des importations iraniennes ont cessé leurs livraisons. Ceci fait monter le prix des importations d’essence de l’Iran qui doit importer presque la moitié de sa consommation à cause de ses capacités de raffinerie insuffisantes. Là encore c’est la population qui paie l’addition. Ajoutons qu’une application totale de ces sanctions impliquerait un blocus maritime, ce qui équivaudrait à un acte de guerre.

Paralyser la population civile

Ainsi des personnalités de la société civile iranienne et des économistes le soulignent, c’est la la population civile qui paie le prix des sanctions. L’économie iranienne – de la production industrielle jusqu’aux secteurs bancaire et financier – a déjà été fortement endommagée par trois décennies de sanctions. Aujourd’hui encore les entreprises ont la plus grande peine à maintenir leurs affaires, car elles doivent compter avec des restrictions dans l’approvisionnement en biens indispensables et sont souvent obligées, pour les obtenir, de payer un prix plus élevé. Les faillites et les licenciements sont une conséquence fréquente de ces difficultés et approfondissent la crise économique du pays. En outre, la communauté scientifique souffre de difficultés d’accès aux dernières conquêtes de la recherche international, tandis que le développement technique est également freiné.

Les risques que présentent les sanctions pour la société civile ont été abordé par le chef de l’opposition Mir-Hossein Moussavi : « Les sanctions n’auraient pas d’effet sur le gouvernement, elles causeraient plutôt un mal sérieux à la population […]. Nous refusons toute sanction envers notre nation », a-t-il déclaré très clairement en automne dernier. Son associé Mehdi Karroubi s’est exprimé dans le même sens dans une interview accordée au Corriere della Sera.

Un problème de fond demeure, qui n’attire guère l’attention de tous ceux qui ont succombé à la dangereuse illusion qu’ils pourraient avoir leur mot à dire dans la définition et la mise en œuvre des sanctions contre l’Iran : c’est que celles-ci sont élaborées essentiellement par le lobby pro-israélien aux Etats-Unis – l’American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) – et sont la plupart du temps soumises au Congrès pour la forme, pour être ensuite mises en œuvre par le sous-secrétaire d’Etat au terrorisme et au renseignement financier (Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence) Stuart Levey – un homme de confiance de l’AIPAC. Dans ce processus, les retombées potentielles sur le peuple iranien ne jouent pratiquement aucun rôle.

Les sanctions – qu’elles soient « paralysantes » ou « avisées » – nuisent en fin de compte à la population. Des « sanctions avisées » sont ainsi un oxymore comparable  aux « bombes intelligentes » qui sauraient prétendument ne cibler que les objectifs à détruire, au moyen de « frappes chirurgicales ». Et comme pour leurs consœurs  militaires ce sont en définitive les « dommages collatéraux» des « sanctions avisées » qui l’emportent.  Les trouver « avisées » ne peut donc être considérer que comme du pur cynisme.

Une arme politique émoussée dans le monde d’aujourd’hui

En outre, dans un monde mondialisé et de plus en plus multipolaire, les sanctions s’avèrent n’être qu’une arme émoussée, surtout lorsqu’elles visent des pays riches en réserves d’énergie. Les acteurs guidés par leurs seuls intérêts économiques ne manquent pas, trop heureux d’occuper le vide commercial ainsi créé. C’est ainsi que des firmes chinoises, russes et même américaines – agissant via Dubaï – ont largement profité du retrait des concurrents européens sous la pression de Washington.

Devenues une quasi-obsession dans les milieux politiques en Occident, les sanctions ne sont pas un remède efficace menant à la guérison, mais agissent plutôt comme un lent poison administré à la société civile iranienne et à son mouvement démocratique. Prototype de guerre économique, les sanctions conjointement avec les appels réguliers à la guerre constituent un mélange explosif. Les tambours guerriers, qui se font entendre à nouveau, battent à nouveau sur le cœur battant de la société civile iranienne.

Le développement démocratique empoisonné par les sanctions et les menaces de guerre

Contrairement à la doxa politique, les sanctions nuisent en fait à la société civile et consolident la position des faucons. La classe moyenne iranienne est touchée par cet isolement qui n’en finit pas, d’autant plus que les sanctions atteignent les commerçants honnêtes et profitent aux corrompus. Les Gardiens, qui contrôlent vraisemblablement 60 ports dans le golfe Persique, par lesquels passe l’essentiel des importations, peuvent poursuivre leurs affaires, souvent par des « canaux douteux ».

Et c’est pourquoi l’un des « dommages collatéraux » pas tout à fait caché de ces sanctions sans fin est de faire obstacle à une transition démocratique durable en Iran. En fait cette dernière représenterait un risque pour le statu quo régional, et notamment pour la stabilité des autocraties de la région, alliées de l’Occident.

Que faire ? «Frappes chirurgicales» ou une véritable diplomatie ?

L’histoire infinie des sanctions a au moins le mérite d’illustrer les tentatives quasi désespérées des dirigeants politiques occidentaux à imposer leur volonté à l’Iran : On se donne ainsi l’impression de « faire » quand même quelque chose, afin d’avoir au moins l’air « crédibles ». Une entreprise somme toute vouée à l’échec et même dangereuse. Car il est fort à craindre que dans la foulée des « sanctions avisées » l’appel aux « frappes chirurgicales » se fasse finalement rapidement entendre.

Au lieu de s’abandonner à l’espérance illusoire que les sanctions produiront l’effet souhaité dans un avenir pas trop lointain, on devrait y mettre un terme une fois pour toutes. La seule issue consisterait à avoir le courage d’une politique capable de désarmer les faucons de tous bords, dont les affaires prospèrent admirablement dans le cercle vicieux de l’animosité. Ce n’est que par une vraie politique de détente qu’on cessera de manière durable d’apporter de l’eau au moulin des radicalismes – et que l’on contribuera en prime à un renoncement durable à la politique sécuritaire en Iran. Lever les sanctions déjà existantes, qui s’en prennent souvent aux secteurs civils, pourrait faire des miracles et ébranler considérablement les fondements des acteurs qui poussent à la confrontation.

En dépit d’affirmations hâtives, la voie diplomatique est loin d’être épuisée ; bien au contraire. Une politique de détente devrait permettre de renoncer à des mesures punitives et à la menace de guerre, et au lieu de celles-là, par le biais de mesures qui créeraient un climat de confiance réciproque, permettrait une solution équitable des défis sécuritaires qui fragilisent la région. Le problème central se trouve en fait dans le dilemme de la sécurité à l’échelle régionale. L’Occident serait donc bien avisé s’efforcer résolument de contraindre Israël – puissance nucléaire majeure – au régime de non-prolifération. On devrait donc mettre fin à la « diplomatie coercitive » envers l’Iran – comme on la désigne avec pertinence dans les Études diplomatiques – car elle assombrit les perspectives de paix et celles du processus de démocratisation.

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Les dommages collatéraux des « sanctions ciblées » contre l’Iran” [The Collateral Damages of “Targeted Sanctions” against Iran], À l’encontre: Revue politique virtuelle, Switzerland, 11 May;

republished on Mondialisation.ca, Canada, 15/05;

▪ slightly abridged version published as Sanctions contre l’Iran, sanctions contre les Iraniens [Sanctions against Iran, Sanctions against Iranians], Mediapart, France, 14/05.

* * *

Unkluge Kollateralschäden “smarter Sanktionen” gegen Iran

Getrübte Aussichten auf Demokratie, sozio-ökonomischer Entwicklung und Konfliktlösung, wenn der Westen weiterhin auf Strafmaßnahmen setzt

Das saisonale Aufflackern der Kriegstreiber fand ihren Höhepunkt in dem Aufruf des US-Neokonservativen Daniel Pipes an Barack Obama, Iran zu bombardieren, um seine Präsidentschaft zu retten. Kurz zuvor hatte Tony Blair – als er ausführte, wie er dabei half, den Irak zu überfallen – noch ominös bemerkt, dass „wir heute beim Iran vor dem selben Problem stehen“. Und ganze 58 Male führte er den Namen Iran im Munde. Der Chilcot-Untersuchungsausschuss in Großbritannien über die Ereignisse rund um den Irak-Krieg fiel zynischerweise mit einer beachtlichen militärischen Aufrüstung in der Region des Persischen Golfes zusammen. Zuletzt wurde gemeldet, dass hunderte Bunker brechende Bomben von Kalifornien auf die Insel Diego Garcia im Indischen Ozean verschifft wurden, von wo aus die letzten zwei Angriffe auf den Irak geflogen wurden. All dies ereignet sich inmitten der fortgesetzten Anstrengungen der iranischen Bürgerrechtsbewegung und Verlautbarungen westlicher Politiker diese unterstützungswert  zu halten. Doch gibt es Anzeichen für Letzteres?

Im Gegensatz zu Krieg werden Sanktionen weithin als notwendige, nachgerade gesunde Medizin betrachtet, mit der ein Kurswechsel beim politischen Opponenten erwirkt werden kann. Die Geschichte des Konfliktes zwischen dem Westen und Iran bescheinigt jedoch, dass Sanktionen eher die Krise am Leben hielten, als dass sie zu ihrer Beilegung beitrugen. Dessen ungeachtet scheinen westliche Regierungen eine regelrechte Faszination für Sanktionen nicht eingebüßt zu haben.

Der anfängliche Ruf nach “lähmenden Sanktionen” verstummte zunächst, als im letzten Sommer die eindrucksvolle „grüne“ Welle die Straßen Teherans bedeckte, nicht zuletzt aus der Besorgnis heraus, ebenjene zu lähmen. Heute sind Sanktionen wieder in aller Munde, nur schmücken die gutartig klingenden Adjektive „klug“ oder „gezielt“ die nunmehr angestrebten Strafmaßnahmen. Ein genauer Blick jedoch lässt hierbei eine gehörige Portion Wunschdenken zutage treten.

Gigantische Dimension „smarter Sanktionen“

„Smarte Sanktionen“, so wird behauptet, seien ein Zaubermittel, womit das Böse enthauptet würde. Im Falle Irans wird nun das Böse mit den Revolutionsgarden identifiziert. Ursprünglich zur Verteidigung des Landes gegen den irakischen Angriff in den 80er Jahren errichtet, haben sich die Garden zu einem expansiven gesellschaftlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Konglomerat entwickelt, denen eine unvergleichliche Macht in der heutigen Islamischen Republik zugesprochen wird.

„Kluge Sanktionen“ sollen demnach gezielt die Position der Garden innerhalb der iranischen Machtstruktur beschädigen. Vernachlässigt wird jedoch die logische Folgerung aus der Tatsache, dass sich ein Großteil der iranischen Wirtschaft in den Händen der Garden befindet: Die in die Hunderttausende gehenden Zivilisten und ihre Familien, deren Auskommen mit den weitgefächerten Wirtschaftsbranchen der Garden verbunden ist, würden ebenso getroffen. Dies lässt die gigantische Dimension des angeblich punktuellen Vorhabens solcher Strafmaßnahmen erahnen.

So genannte „lähmende Sanktionen“, welche zuvorderst Irans Benzinzufuhr beschneiden sollen, werden in den USA derzeit auf den Weg gebracht. In Erwartung solcher unilateraler US-Sanktionen haben die weltgrößten Versicherungskonzerne ihren bereits Rückzug aus Iran angekündigt. Ebenfalls haben weltweit führende Benzinhändler ihre Lieferungen, die vor Kurzem noch die Hälfte iranischer Einfuhren abdeckten, eingestellt. Dies betrifft in empfindlichem Maße sowohl den Finanz- und Schiffssektor und verteuert die Benzineinfuhren Irans, der fast die Hälfte seines Verbrauchs importieren muss. Auch hierbei ist die Bevölkerung die Leidtragende. Hinzu kommt, dass eine vollständige Implementierung solcher Handelssanktionen eine Meeresblockade notwendig machen würde, was jedoch einem Kriegsakt gleichkäme.

Die Zivilbevölkerung lähmen

Wie Persönlichkeiten aus der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft und auch Ökonomen betonen, wird der Preis von Sanktionen von der breiten Bevölkerung getragen. Irans Wirtschaft – von der Produktion, der Landwirtschaft bis hin zum Banken- und Finanzsektor – wurde bereits durch drei Jahrzehnte Sanktionsgeschichte in Mitleidenschaft gezogen. Noch heute können Unternehmen mit Schwierigkeiten ihre Geschäfte aufrechterhalten, da sie bei der Beschaffung notwendiger Güter mit Einschränkungen zu rechnen haben und nicht selten gezwungen sind, höhere Preise zu zahlen. Des Weiteren leidet auch die wissenschaftliche Community durch den eingeschränkten Zugang zu Forschungserrungenschaften weltweit, während technologische Entwicklungen ausgebremst werden.

Die Risiken, die Sanktionen auch für die Zivilgesellschaft darstellen, hat Oppositionsführer Mir-Hossein Mussavi vergangenen Herbst in einer Erklärung zur Sprache gebracht: „Sanktionen würden nicht gegen die Regierung wirken – eher würden sie nur einem Volk ernsthaft Leid zufügen, das großes Unheil seitens seiner eigenen Staatsmänner davongetragen hat. Wir lehnen jede Art von Sanktionen gegen unsere Nation ab,“ schrieb er unmissverständlich. Ebenso äußerte sich sein Mitstreiter Mehdi Karroubi kürzlich in einem Interview gegenüber Corriere della Serra.

Unterdessen verbleibt ein grundsätzliches Problem, was kaum die notwendige Beachtung findet, vor allem von jenen, die der abenteuerlichen Illusion erliegen sind, die Ausgestaltung und Implementierung von Sanktionen mit bestimmen zu können: Iran-Sanktionen werden hauptsächlich von der American Israeli Public Affairs Committeekonzipiert, dem US-Kongress in den meisten Fällen zum bloßen Durchwinken vorgelegt und schließlich im Finanzministerium vom Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial IntelligenceStuart Leveyein AIPAC-Vertrauter – implementiert. Im Zuge dieses ganzen Prozesses spielen die für die iranische Zivilgesellschaft potentiell schädlichen Folgen kaum eine Rolle. (AIPAC)

Sanktionen – ob “lähmend” oder “smart” – fügen letzten Endes der Bevölkerung Schaden zu. “Kluge Sanktionen” sind ebenso ein Oxymoron wie “intelligente Bomben”, welche angeblich in gezielter Manier mit „chirurgischen Schlägen“ ausschließlich die üblen Komponenten ausnehmen. Und wie ihre militaristischen Geschwister im Geiste überwiegen schließlich die „Kollateralschäden“ „smarter Sanktionen“. Diese als „klug“ zu empfinden, kann denn nur als purer Zynismus gelten.

Eine stumpfe politische Waffe in der heutigen Welt

Darüber hinaus entpuppen sich Sanktionen in einer globalisierten, zunehmend multipolaren Welt als stumpfe politische Waffe, zumal wenn sie noch auf energiereiche Länder abzielen. Zahlreich sind jene durch Profit gelenkten Akteure, die nur zu froh darüber sind, das von anderen hinterlassene Vakuum zu füllen. Somit haben bislang chinesische, russische, sogar US-amerikanische (via Dubai agierende) Firmen beträchtlich durch den allmählichen, unter Washingtoner Druck erfolgten, Rückzug europäischer Wettbewerber profitiert.

Die in manchen westlichen Politikkreisen nahezu obsessiv betrachteten Sanktionen sind keine Heilung versprechende Medizin, sondern wirken eher wie ein langsames Gift, die der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft und ihrer Demokratiebewegung zugeführt wird. Als Prototyp wirtschaftlicher Kriegsführung stellen Sanktionen gemeinsam mit dem saisonal aufflammenden Ruf nach Krieg eine gefährliche Mischung dar. Die nun wieder vernehmbaren Kriegstrommeln schlagen wieder einmal auf das pulsierende Herz der iranischen Zivilgesellschaft.

Sanktionen und Kriegsdrohungen: Gift für demokratische Entwicklung

Im Gegensatz zu politischen Bekenntnissen schaden Sanktionen der Zivilgesellschaft, während die Stellung der Hardliner zementiert wird. Irans Mittelschicht wird durch diese weitere Isolation des Landes getroffen, zumal Sanktionen ehrliche Händler bestrafen, korrupte wiederum belohnen. Die Garden, denen man die Kontrolle von 60 Häfen am Persischen Golf zurechnet, durch denen sie ein Gros der Importe abwickeln, können weiterhin auf blühende Geschäfte durch oftmals “dunkle Kanäle” setzen.

So ist der nicht ganz versteckte “Kollateralschaden” der nimmer enden wollenden Sanktionen ein nachhaltiger Übergang zu Demokratie in Iran. Letzterer würde für den Status-Quo in der Region samt seiner mit dem Westen befreundeten Autokratien ein herrschaftspolitisches Risiko darstellen.

Was nun? „Chirurgische Schläge“ oder ernsthafte Diplomatie?

Die unendliche Sanktions-Geschichte spiegelt denn auch den nahezu verzweifelten Versuch westlicher Politiker wider, im Angesicht widriger Umstände ihren Willen Iran aufzuzwingen, ihrer eigenen „Glaubwürdigkeit“ wegen doch etwas „zu tun“. Ein alles in allem vergebliches, sogar gefährliches, Unternehmen. Denn nicht zuletzt wird zu befürchten sein, dass im Anschluss an „klugen Sanktionen“, der Ruf nach „chirurgischen Militärschlägen“ nicht lange auf sich warten lässt.

Anstatt der illusorischen Hoffnung weiterhin zu erliegen, dass eines nicht allzu fernen Tages Sanktionen ihre erwünschte Entfaltung ausbreiten, müsste man ein für allemal die Bremse ziehen. Der einzige Ausweg wäre, eine Politik zu beherzigen, die in der Lage wäre, Hardliner aller Seiten zu entwaffnen, deren Geschäft in dem Teufelskreis der Feindseligkeit nur allzu gut gedeiht. Nur durch eine Entspannungspolitik kann man das Wasser auf den Mühlen der Radikalismen nachhaltig abtragen – und überdies zu einer nachhaltigen Entversicherheitlichung iranischer Politik beitragen. Existierende Sanktionen, die oft zivile Güter betreffen, aufzuheben, könnte Wunder bewirken und erheblich die Fundamente konfrontationslustiger Akteure erschüttern.

Trotz unreifer Behauptungen, hat sich der diplomatische Weg nicht erschöpft. Man ist ganz im Gegenteil noch lange davon entfernt. Zumal ein Kernproblem im regionalen Sicherheitsdilemma besteht, wäre es in der Tat wirklich klug, wenn sich der Westen ernsthaft bemühte, die Atommacht Israel an das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime zu binden. Die transatlantische “Zwangsdiplomatie” gegenüber Iran – wie man sie in Diplomatischen Studien zutreffend benennt – sollte somit eingestellt werden, da sie Aussichten auf Frieden und eine Entwicklung hin zur Demokratie trübt.

QUELLE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) Unkluge Kollateralschäden „smarter Sanktionen“ gegen Iran, Telepolis, 23. März;

erschienen in FriedensJournal, Nr. 3/2010 (Mai), S. 6–7.

auch veröffentlicht auf ZNet Deutschland, 23.03.

auch veröffentlicht auf Global Research, deutsche Site, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 29.04.

Iran: Gescheiterter Auftakt im Atompoker

Der Verhandlungsprozess zwischen dem Westen und dem Iran war in der Vergangenheit nicht von Erfolg gekrönt, vielmehr hat sein Misslingen zur Eskalation des Konfliktes beigetragen. Es war ein vorhersehbares Scheitern, der vom Westen bevorzugte »Zuckerbrot-und-Peitsche«-Ansatz setzte auf Letzteres, ohne das Erstere ernst zu nehmen. Durch die machtpolitisch forcierte rechtliche Diskriminierung Irans im sog. Atomstreit, perpetuiert von den den Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (NVV) missachtenden Atommächten USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich und Israel, wurde mit der Konstruktion des Schreckgespenstes iranische, »islamische« Bombe politischer Druck auf Teheran erzeugt.

Nach acht Jahren der konfrontativen Bush-Politik, deren neokonservatives Säbelrasseln die Welt an den Abgrund eines Krieges mit Iran brachte, wurden an Obamas versöhnlichere Töne viele Hoffnungen geknüpft. Mit seiner Ankündigung mit Teheran in direkte Verhandlungen zu treten, wurde dann auch formal betrachtet ein neues Kapitel in den Beziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern eröffnet. Die erste Episode begann am 1. Oktober 2009, als in Genf Verhandlungen zur Beilegung des »Atomstreits« zwischen Iran und den G5+1 (den fünf ständigen UN-Sicherheitsratsmitgliedern und Deutschland) begannen.

Zu der strategischen Notwendigkeit für die USA, angesichts ihrer Kriege im Irak und in Afghanistan mit der Regionalmacht Iran direkte Gespräche zu führen, kam eine nuklearpolitische Dimension hinzu. […]

Lesen Sie hier weiter.

QUELLE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2010) “Iran: Gescheiterter Auftakt im Atompoker”, in: Informationsstelle Wissenschaft und Frieden (Hg.) 2008: Yes we can – 2010: No I can’t? Ein Jahr US-Außen- und Militärpolitik unter Obama, Dossier Nr. 63, Beilage zu Wissenschaft und Frieden, Jg. 28, Nr. 1 (Februar). [Fertigstellung des Artikels: 5. Januar 2010]

 

About the article | “Iran: Failed Prelude to the Nuclear Poker” (in German) by Ali Fathollah-Nejad deals with Obama’s Iran policy after one year in office while focusing on the nuclear talks from the 1 October 2009 Geneva meetings until the end of the year. It was published in a supplement to the leading German peace research journal Wissenschaft & Frieden (Science & Peace) on Obama’s foreign and military policies.

Dem Iran drohen im Atomstreit schärfere Sanktionen

zenith

Im September bekamen jene Aufwind, die dem Iran vorwerfen, sein Atomprogramm zu verheimlichen. Teheran hatte nämlich angekündigt, dass eine zweite Uran-Anreicherungsanlage in Ghom gebaut wird, wovon die Öffentlichkeit bis dato nichts wusste. Bei ihrem Besuch hatte die Internationale Atomenergiebehörde (IAEA) Entwarnung gegeben, doch vieles spricht nun dafür, dass sich die USA und die EU über schärfere Sanktionen verständigen, die auch die Energieversorgung Irans tangieren. […]

Der Artikel als pdf.

Das gesamte Heft ist im Zeitschriftenhandel erhältlich oder hier zu bestellen.

QUELLE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad & Miriam Shabafrouz (2009) “Dem Iran drohen im Atomstreit schärfere Sanktionen”, zenith – Zeitschrift für den Orient, Jg. 11, Nr. 4, S. 38–39.

About the article | In “Iran is Threatened with Harsher Sanctions” (in German), Ali Fathollah-Nejad and Miriam Shabafrouz (research fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, GIGA, Hamburg) discuss the ramifications of tigheting sanctions in terms of conflict resolution in the West-Iran stand-off and the political development of Iran. Exclusive statements have been gathered from Professor Volker Perthes (director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin),  Professor Henner Fürtig (sanctions expert and director of GIGA’s Institute of Middle East Studies) and Dr. Patrick Clawson (deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.). Published in zenith, one of the leading Middle East magazines in Germany.

What Middle East Policy to Expect from the New German Government?

When Promising Ideas Threaten to be Buried in Transatlantic Waters

e-IR

PRAISE

»Great paper« (Professor Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University, UK)

»Very interesting« (Dr. Elaheh Rostami-Povey, London Middle East Institute)

»Very good« (Ahmed Ijaz Malik, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad)

Last week, on 28 October, a new German government took office. A coalition of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s still ruling conservative Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) with the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) as junior partner replaced the Grand Coalition of conservatives (CDU/CSU) and social-democrats (SPD). While the new administration is faced with multiple socio-economic crises internally, on the external front the challenges are not less significant.

At a press conference held in Berlin a few days after the election outcome, prospective foreign minister Guido Westerwelle[1] refused to respond in English after a BBC reporter had asked him to do so. When, in quite a non-chalant manner, he added that “This is Germany here”, the field for polemics had been opened. Not only did speculations spark about the FDP leader’s supposedly missing English language proficiency (although one would hardly think that any of his predecessors did better – quite the contrary), the political leanings of a FDP-run Foreign Ministry entered the debate.

Pragmatic answers to Mideast challenges

In an interview[2] to the journal of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) – perhaps the most influential German foreign policy think-tank[3] –, Westerwelle’s statements were quite astonishing. On the war in Afghanistan, he pledged “to end every German military deployment as quickly as is realistically possible” while nonetheless echoing the highly controversial claim made by former Defense Minister Peter Struck (SPD) that Germany was being defended in the Hindu-Kush. Still he appeared more straightforward than many in the SPD or even the Green Party – who tend to succumb to a paternalistic “liberal interventionism” – when stating that the Afghanistan operation was not based on “altruism”.

On Iran, he recognized the central requirement of improving U.S.–Iranian relations and praised Obama’s “de-escalation” imprint as opposed to George W. Bush’s “policies of containment and escalation”. As a second key element, he pointed to the precarious security architecture both globally and regionally. The nuclear powers would need to cut their arsenals, thus following their obligations enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[4]. “The more seriously the existing nuclear powers take their obligation to help create a world free of nuclear weapons, the greater credence they will have in the eyes of states like Iran, who [sic!] find the prospect of possessing a nuclear arsenal extremely tempting,” Westerwelle added.

He further pleaded for a regional approach to the manifold Middle East conflicts, modeled on the so-called Helsinki Process, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in the 1970s. For some years now, conflict researchers and international peace organizations have strongly advocated that a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME)[5] be set as number one of the global political agenda. However, while the latter envisages civil society participation, Westerwelle’s suggestion comprises the involvement of the U.S., Russia and the UN.

Despite the unsatisfying details of his Middle East plan – which by the way underlines Berlin’s commitment to a two-state solution in the Israel/Palestine conflict –, there appears to be an improvement from past orientations. While the former Foreign Ministry headed by the SPD’s Frank-Walter Steinmeier proved to be quite disregardful of such an idea, the acknowledgement by the FDP, which over the last few years has consistently favored such an initiative, is without doubt a development in the right direction as how to handle the much-loaded Mideast crises.

The Coalition Agreement: Westerwelle’s foreign policy ideas enriched with a conservative flavor

The conceptions promoted by Westerwelle have indeed found their way into the Coalition Agreement[6] (pp. 121-122) – though enriched with a clear conservative handwriting. This is displayed when in Berlin’s official attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the agreement states that the new government, along with its partners, would support harsher sanctions against Tehran if necessary. Such a political instrument was hardly favored by the FDP in the past which had been rather critical towards the Grand Coalition’s handling of the Iran dossier and Berlin’s unflinching insistence on the “carrot and stick” approach that after all proved to be a failure[7]. On the contrary, voicing the stark resentment from considerable branches of the industry, the Liberals criticized the government in Bundestag appellations[8] for imposing trade limitations on German companies, which went beyond the sanctions framework as mandated by UN Security Council resolutions.

Yet, in a speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) on 22 October, the President of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), Hans-Peter Keitel, pointed to the fact that Washington would not wish to see the sanctions regime bypassed. This indicates that Germany still fears the U.S. Treasury Department’s warnings to be excluded from the vast American market if trade ties with Iran are being maintained. This happens while German entrepreneurs moan about losing the Iranian market while Chinese and American companies, directly and indirectly respectively, get increasingly involved there.

Providing a nice face for “Germany’s defense in the Hindu-Kush”

Nevertheless, the FDP’s fresh conceptions are likely to be counterbalanced by a strong transatlanticist camp within the much stronger Union parties. One of the latter’s exponents is the new Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU). The Bavarian aristocrat is a member of the DGAP, the Atlantik-Brücke (“Atlantic Bridge”), the Aspen Institute, and spokesman for his party’s Transatlantic Forum – all of which advocate a strict Atlantic orientation of German foreign policy. Being one of the most prominent[9] German politicians, Guttenberg is expected to provide a handsome image for the highly contested war in Afghanistan, which his predecessor, the sallow Franz-Josef Jung (CDU), plainly failed to do. Jens Berger, whose blog Der Spiegelfechter (“shadow boxer”) is amongst the country’s most read[10], writes[11]: „In Washington there is no single neoconservative think-tank in which the name Guttenberg would not prompt a pleasurable click on the tongue”. In the meanwhile, it is expected[12] that the policies around the “Afghanistan problem” will not be set in the liberal Foreign Ministry, but in the conservative Defense Ministry.

Hawks vs. public opinion: Militarization or security?

A definite darling of America’s neo-cons is Eckart von Klaeden, an Atlantik-Brücke executive committee member, who is the Foreign Policy Spokesman for the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group. Known for his hawkish stances, he can be expected to lobby against any FDP initiatives trespassing the transatlantic framework. Despite a majority[13] of Germans favoring the Bundeswehr’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Guttenberg[14] and Klaeden[15] have repeatedly favored the military engagement there – which the Obama Administration wants the Germans to even boost further. In December, the Bundestag will decide upon the continuation of its mandate for what euphemistically is often called “peace and stabilization mission”.

By currently providing about 4,500 troops in the no-longer calm northern areas of Afghanistan, Berlin finds itself as third largest troop contributor after Washington and London. It is now being discussed to increase the level of German troops to 7,000. This might reflect the country’s great-power aspirations, as Andreas Buro – one of the founding figures of the German peace movement – accurately notes[16]: “While the NATO states Canada and the Netherlands have announced their troops to be withdrawn already by 2010/2011, the Federal Government still adamantly adheres to the war alliance. Not because of Afghanistan, but because Berlin would like to distinguish itself as an important EU military pillar for the leading NATO power, the US.”

However big the political odds are – be it the CDU/CSU’s transatlantic hawks or America’s call for a rising engagement of her allies – a rational-pragmatic input by the FDP could constructively impact the foreign policy discourse in Europe’s largest country. One can hope that the insight gains in prominence that the only truly responsible way to help Afghanistan to free itself from this mess is to end the NATO war. That the latter provides an indispensable feature for the continued armed conflict in that war-torn country must not remain a historic lesson that only the Left Party and the peace movement have learned. Yet, it remains to be seen how successful the latter two can articulate public opinion and thus force the new government to abstain from a further militarization of Berlin’s foreign policy. Germany’s – and for that matter, any other NATO member’s – security is not defended in the Hindu-Kush, but jeopardized.

 

 


[1] See Cate Connolly, “German election: Guido Westerwelle sets sights on foreign ministry”, guardian.co.uk, 28 Sep. 2009. 

[2]Guido Westerwelle’s Foreign Policy: Germany’s new foreign minister answers IP”, IP Global, 27 Sep. 2009.

[3] See James G. McGann, The Global “Go-To Think Tanks”: The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations In The World, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2008, p. 26 (Table No. 2).

[4] For the text of the NPT, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm.

[5]CSCME: Number one on the world political agenda”, IPPNW.de, Initiated by IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) e.V. (Registered Association) and IALANA (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) Germany, 1 Feb. 2007.

[6] Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 16th Legislative Period, enacted and signed on 26 Oct. 2009.

[7] See Christoph Bertram, Rethinking Iran: From Confrontation to Cooperation, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (Chaillot Paper, No. 110, August 2008).

[8] See http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP16/121/12109.html.

[9] See e.g. “Beliebteste Politiker: Guttenberg zieht an Merkel vorbei”, FR-online.de, 24 July 2009.

[10] See http://www.deutscheblogcharts.de/archiv/2009-42.html.

[11] Jens Berger, “Deutschland wird Schwarz(Gelb): Der Koalitionsvertrag steht und die Versprechen des Wahlkampfs sind vergessen”, Telepolis, 24 Oct. 2009.

[12] René Heilig, “Bundeswehr bleibt an der Afghanistan-Front: Verbündete ziehen ab, Deutschland steht zum »Mittelweg« – was will Westerwelle?“, Neues Deutschland (Berlin),   22. Oct. 2009.

[13] See e.g. “stern-Umfrage zu Afghanistan: Deutsche für Abzug – und für Jung”, stern.de, 16 Sep. 2009.

[14] Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, “Afghans Respond Favorably to NATO Efforts in Afghanistan”, Atlantic-Community.org, 7 Jan. 2008.

[15] Eckart von Klaeden, “Afghanistan: Der richtige Einsatz” [Afghanistan Is Not Iraq – Germany Must Stay!], Die Zeit, No. 30/2009.

[16] Andreas Buro, “Abzug jetzt: Friedenspolitik statt Krieg” [Withdrawal Now: Peace Policy Instead of War], junge Welt (Berlin), 8 Oct. 2009, p. 8.

 

SOURCE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2009) “What Middle East Policy to Expect from the New German Government? When Promising Ideas Threaten to be Buried in Transatlantic Waters“, e-International Relations (e-IR), 4 November;

republished on Global Research, Montreal: Centre for Research on Globalization, 05/11;

republished on Foreign Policy Journal, 08/11;

republished on Iran Review, 08/11;

republished on Payvand Iran News, 16/11;

slightly edited version published on Monthly Review Webzine, 06/11/2009.

 

60 Jahre Nakba: Von ethnischer Säuberung zur Dekolonisierung?

 

Im Februar fand an der Londoner »School of Oriental and African Studies« (SOAS) die wohl seit Jahren hochkarätigste internationale wissenschaftliche Tagung zum Nahostkonflikt statt. Unter dem Titel „Die ‚Nakba‘: Sechzig Jahre Enteignung, sechzig Jahre Widerstand“ diskutierten auf Einladung des »London Middle East Institute« über zwei Tage lang führende Wissenschaftler über so diverse Themen, wie die oftmals wenig beachtete palästinensische Geschichtserfahrung und Leidensgeschichte, die Geschichtsschreibung Palästinas und des Konfliktes mit Israel, sowie Facetten und Aussichten des nationalen Widerstands gegen die israelische Besatzung. Ebenso zur Sprache kamen der einen Monat zurückliegende israelische Waffengang in Gaza und Möglichkeiten und Wege einer gerechten Lösung des nun über sechs Dekaden schwelenden Konfliktes, dessen Beilegung allerorten als zentral für eine Befriedungsdynamik in der gesamten Region des sog. Nahen und Mittleren Ostens erachtet wird. [pdf]

QUELLE

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (2009) “60 Jahre Nakba: Von ethnischer Säuberung zur Dekolonisierung?”, inamo: Berichte und Analysen zu Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, Berlin: Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten (inamo), Jg. 15, Nr. 58 (Sommer 2009), S. 56–60.

Das inamo-Heft Nr. 58 mit dem Schwerpunkt “Sudan” kann hier bestellt werden.

inamo58

Statement by a Group of Iranian Anti-War Activists about Iran’s Presidential Elections

We are a group of Iranian academic and antiwar activists in Europe and the United States who, in the past few years, have consistently defended Iran’s national interests in all areas including its right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. Our varied activities in the face of anti-Iran propaganda by the neoconservatives in the West have included organizing press conferences, taking part in radio and TV debates, creating antiwar websites, publishing bulletins and newsletters, writing opinion pieces and letters to editors, attending national and international antiwar conferences and  petitioning and lobbying western politicians and parliamentarians.

We have campaigned against the policies of the United States and its Western allies which have unjustifiably targeted Iran – including sending Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council, issuing UNSC resolutions against Iran, secret and public efforts to provoke strife in Iran and destabilize the country, and threats by the United States and Israel for military intervention and bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

As we approach Iran’s presidential elections, we are duty bound to share the lessons of our antiwar activities and highlight what national policies can defend Iran’s interests effectively in the international arena without isolating it or enduring U.N. sanctions.

In order to safeguard Iran’s national rights successfully, we think Iran’s president elect must give priority to the following policies in his programs and plans:

(1) Questioning the Holocaust, which has greatly aided the hawks in the West, must be discarded and replaced with a constructive foreign policy devoid of any provocative rhetoric.

(2) Releasing all political prisoners, freedom of press, organizations and political parties, as well as peaceful meetings and gatherings. Recognizing the right of all citizens to run for election without any political vetting.

(3) Abolishing medieval punishments, such as stoning and cutting limbs, public executions, and execution of minors.

(4) Recognizing full and unconditional equality in all areas for women and ethnic minorities. Recognizing the full citizenship and civic rights of official and unofficial religious minorities.

Disregarding these tasks will seriously hinder the social and political development of the country, and will divide the Iranian people in their resistance against the unwarranted neo-colonial pressure and double standards of the Western powers. It will also provide powerful propaganda tools to hawks and their allies in mainstream media for isolating Iran and denying its fundamental rights in international organizations.

Taking steps to carry out these measures, on the other hand, will put our country on a fast track to progress, will unite Iranians of all walks of life, and disarm the neoconservatives in their aggressive propaganda against Iran.

Signed

Professor Ervand Abrahamian, City University of New York

Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, School of Oriental and African Studies

Professor Haleh Afshar, University of York

Professor Mohammad Ala, Persian Gulf Task Force

Professor Hamid Dabashi, Columbia University

Professor Abbas Edalat, Imperial College London

Ali Fathollah-Nejad, University of Muenster and School of Oriental and African Studies

Dr Mehri Honarbin, Canterbury Christ Church University

Dr Farhang Jahanpour, University of Oxford

Mohammad Kamaali, Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran

Professor Mahmoud Karimi-Hakkak, Siena College, New York

Professor Fatemeh Keshavarz, Washington University in St Louis

Dr Ziba Mir-Hosseini, School of Oriental and African Studies

Professor Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh, Tarbiyat Modarres University

Professor Davood Nabi-Rahni, Pace University in New York

Professor Azam Niroomand-Rad, Georgetown University

Dr Ali Rastbeen, International Institute of Strategic Studies Paris

Dr Elaheh Rostami, School of Oriental and African Studies

Professor Nader Sadeghi, George Washington University Hospital

Shirin Saeidi, University of Cambridge

Professor Muhammad Sahimi, University of Southern California

Leila Zand, Fellowship of Reconciliation

SOURCE

Bayâniyeh-e grouhi az faâliyan-e zedd-e jang dar khârej az keshvar dar bâreh-ye entekhâbât-e riâsat jomhouri, Etemad-e Melli & Andisheh-ye No, 08/06/2009.

Statement by a Group of Iranian Anti-War Activists about Iran’s Presidential Elections, 08/06/2009, also published as Statement of Academics, Tehran Bureau, 08/06 | In Defence of Iran, guardian.co.uk, 10/06 | Monthly Review Webzine, 10/06 | Global Research, 10/06 | ZNet, 15/06.

Tahran’ı ‘temize çıkarmak’ için dört basit yöntem, Radikal, 12/06/2009.

Erklärung einer Gruppe von Antikriegsaktivisten an den künftigen iranischen Präsidenten, ZNet Deutschland, 14/06/2009 | republished as Aufruf einer Gruppe von Antikriegsaktivisten an den künftigen iranischen Präsidenten, Sand im Getriebe (SiG), No. 74 (28/06/2009) | short version published as Fortschritt statt provokativer Rhetorik, junge Welt (Berlin), 13/06, p. 8.